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The landmark Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 ("Dodd-Frank") transforms the
regulation of consumer credit in the United States.] Many of its changes have
been high-profile, attracting considerable media and scholarly attention, most
notably the establishment of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
("CFPB"). 2 Even specific consumer reforms, such as a so-called "plain vanilla"
* Thanks to colleagues at the Berkeley Business Law Journal 2011 Symposium "Financial Regulatory
Reform: Dodd-Frank and Beyond" and to Michael Barr, Adam Levitin, Katie Porter, and Adam
Pritchard for reviewing drafts, as well as Carol Yur for research assistance.
1. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.111-203, 124 Stat.
1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank].
2. The Bureau was initially proposed as an Agency; its conversion to a Bureau was both a source of
contention and transition of uncertain significance. See, e.g., Jim Puzzanghcra, Downgrade of Consumer
Financial Protection Agency Threatens Obama's Overhaul Plan, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2010, http://
artieles.latimes.com/20I0/mar/04/busincss/la-fi-financial-reform4-2010mar04; Hon. Jeb Hensarling,
Punishing Consumers to "Protect" Them, WASH. TIMES, July 22, 2009, http://www.washingtontimes.
com/news/2009/jul/22/dont-punish-consumers-in-the-name-of-protection/?fcat=home headlines; Tom
Petruno, Debate Heats up over "'Financial Protection Agency" Proposal, L.A. TIMES, July 23, 2009,
http://Iatimesblogs.latimes.com/money-co/2009107/harvard-law-professor-clizabeth-warren-and-rep-jeb
-hensarling-r-texas-are-in-a-new-smackdown-this-wcek-over-the-idea-of.html; Paul Krugman, Financial
Reform Endgame, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2010, http://www.nytimcs.com/2010/03/0l/opinion/0lkrugman.
html. As an example of the reasoned, deliberative engagement of ideas within the academy, consider the
critique that the agency/bureau would "risk reversing the decades-long trend towards the
democratization of credit[;] create a 'supernanny' agency . . . designed to substitute the choice of
bureaucrats for those of consumers[; and] jeopardize the financial recovery." David S. Evans & Joshua
D. Wright, The Effect of the Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009 on Consumer Credit,
22 Loy. CONSUMER L. REV. 277, 280 (2010). A compromise emerged in the commutation of the
"Agency" into a "Bureau" of the Federal Reserve Board, which may have been a deft middle road or a
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proposal, drew hot debate and lobbying firepower.3 But when the dust settled,
one profoundly transformative innovation that did not garner the same outrage
as plain vanilla or the CFPB did get into the law: imposing upon lenders a duty
4to assure a borrower's ability to repay.
Ensuring a borrower's ability to repay is not an entirely unprecedented legal
concept, to be sure,5 but its wholesale embrace by the Dodd-Frank represents a
sea change in U.S. consumer credit market regulation. This Article does three
things regarding the new duty to assess a consumer's ability to repay mortgage
loans. First, it traces the multifaceted pedigree of this requirement by looking at
fledgling strands in U.S. consumer law, as well as other areas such as securities
law; it also considers its more robust embrace in foreign systems. Second, it
offers conjecture regarding how this broadly stated principle might be put into
practice by the federal regulators. Finally, it provides a brief normative
comment, siding with the supporters of this new obligation on lenders.
DESCRIPTION: WHAT IS IT AND WHERE DID IT COME FROM?
Ability to Pay: The Statutory Requirements
As enacted, Dodd-Frank Section 1411 (b) amends the Truth In Lending Act
("TILA") Chapter 2, 15 USC § 1631 et seq. (2006), by inserting a new section
129C. Title XIV of Dodd-Frank is subtitled the "Mortgage Reform and Anti-
predatory Lending Act," and Section 1411 provides the following new
obligation on all mortgage lenders (originators and brokers):
MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE LOANS.
Ability to Repay.-
In general.-In accordance with regulations prescribed by the Board, no creditor
may make a residential mortgage loan unless the creditor makes a reasonable and
good faith determination based on verified and documented information that, at the
largely atmospheric move given the as-enacted Bureau's independent budgetary powers, director, etc.
See Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, §§ 1011-1012, 124 Stat. 1964-66, § 1017, 124 Stat. 1975-79.
3. See Congress Wary of "Plain Vanilla" Bank Proposal: Industry Thinks President Obama's
Proposal Would Be Too Intrusive, AsSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 22, 2009, available at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/32968985/ns/business-consumer-news/; Richard H. Thaler, Economic
View: Mortgages Made Simpler, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/
07/05/busincss/economy/05view.html. Plain vanilla rules (offering safe harbor to financial product
providers who offer exotic products in conjunction with simplified ones) find their origin in Michael S.
Barr, Sendhil Mullainathan & Eldar Shafir, Behaviorally Informed Financial Services Regulation, New
America Foundation (2008), available at http:/www.newamerica.net/files/naf behavioral_v5.pdf. One
lobbyist at a recent conference described the Barr et al. paper as "terrifying" upon realizing it was
authored by the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury who would become a chief architect of Dodd-Frank.
See Nessa Feddis, VP & Sr. Counsel for Regulatory Compliance, Am. Bankers Ass'n, Remarks at the
2011 Marquette Law School Public Service Program: New Directions in Consumer and Community
Financial Protection (Feb. 25, 2011).
4. Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, § 1411, 124 Stat. 2142.
5. See discussion infra of U.S. precedents and analogues.
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time the loan is consummated, the consumer has a reasonable ability to repay the
loan, according to its terms, and all applicable taxes, insurance (including mortgage
guarantee insurance), and assessments.
In fleshing out the discharge of this duty, Dodd-Frank continues:
(3) Basis for determination.-A determination under this subsection of a
consumer's ability to repay a residential mortgage loan shall include consideration
of the consumer's credit history, current income, expected income the consumer is
reasonably assured of receiving, current obligations, debt-to-income ratio or the
residual income the consumer will have after paying non-mortgage debt and
mortgage-related obligations, employment status, and other financial resources
other than the consumer's equity in the dwelling .... A creditor shall determine the
ability of the consumer to repay using a payment schedule that fully amortizes the
loan over the term of the loan. 7-
Similar requirements of assuring repayment ability are found in the
cognate-spirited Credit CARD Act ("CARD"), with near-identical
terminology. 8 CARD preceded Dodd-Frank in passage, but its content is part of
omnibus reform of the financial markets.
Past as Prologue: Pre-Dodd-Frank Mortgage Regulations
Those versed in contract law doubtless appreciate the departure from the
spirit of caveat emptor that these revisions impose. Contract Law 101 insists
that you are not your brother's keeper, 9 and this is especially so with lenders.
"[A]bsent special circumstances, a loan does not establish a fiduciary
relationship between a commercial bank and its debtor."' 10 Case law repeatedly
affirms that lenders need only look out for themselves and has consistently
rejected attempts to inject a duty to analyze the borrower's ability to pay."
6. Dodd-Frank, supra note I, § 1411, 124 Stat. 2142.
7. Id. at 2143.
8. Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, §
109, 124 Stat. 1743 (2009) ("A card issuer may not open any credit card account for any consumer
under an open end consumer credit plan, or increase any credit limit applicable to such account, unless
the card issuer considers the ability of the consumer to make the required payments under the terms of
such account.").
9. See, e.g., Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. 178 (1817):
The maxim of caveat emptor could never have crept into the law, if the province of ethics had
been co-extensive with it. There was, in the present case, no circumvention or manoeuvre
practised by the vendee, unless rising earlier in the morning, and obtaining by superior
diligence and alertness that intelligence by which the price of commodities was regulated, be
such. It is a romantic equality that is contended for on the other side. Parties never can be
precisely equal in knowledge, either of facts or of the inferences from such facts, and both
must concur in order to satisfy the rule contended for. The absence of all authority in England
and the United States, both great commercial countries, speaks volumes against the
reasonableness and practicability of such a rule.
10. Das v. Bank of America, 186 Cal. App. 4th 727, 740 (2010).
I1. See, e.g., Renteria v. U.S., 452 F. Supp.2d 910 (D. Ariz. 2006) (lack of duty is because any
assessment would be for lender's, not borrower's, protection); Nymark v. Heart Fed. Savs. & Loan, 231
Cal.App.3d 1089 (1991) (commercial lenders look after own interests only); Wagner v. Benson, 101
Cal. App.3d 27 (1980) (same). John D. Wright, Dodd-Frank's "Abusive" Standard: A Call for
Certainty, 8 BERKELEY BUS. L. J. (forthcoming Oct. 2011), available at http://www.law.bcrkeley.edu
/files/bclbe/DoddFrankAbusiveStandardPaper.pdf. (I am grateful to John D. Wright for suggesting
Berkeley Business Law Journal
"[T]he lender has no judicially imposed duty to ensure ability to repay the
loan .... 12 In fact, "lenders do not even owe borrowers a duty of care to avoid
negligence in the lending process"' 3 One bank lawyer confidently asserted that
"[s]trong public policies support a solvent financial system and low barriers to
home ownership and these policies militate against exposing mortgage lenders
to fiduciary duties and litigation risks."' 4
No more under Dodd-Frank. Section 1411 represents a great step for
commercial law. Yet the seeds of change were cross-metaphorically percolating
well, before 2010. Consider the recent history of residential mortgage
regulation. 15 Prior to 1982, there were good, old-fashioned rules (not standards)
imposed by statute on mortgage originators, such as the hard cap of a ninety
percent "loan-to-value" ("LTV") ratio for improved real estate loans issued by
national banks and maximum thirty-year full amortization terms for residential
mortgages. 16  Then the headiness of 1980s deregulation brought such
developments as the Garn-St. Germain Act' 7 (and the related Alternative
Mortgage Transactions Parity Act),' 8 which boldly dispatched such backward-
thinking, heavy-government suffocation of consumer credit. Recall that the
Community Reinvestment Act ("CRA") was passed in 1977, 19 and so such
deregulatory moves were not only consonant with the spirit of the 1980s but
could also be couched in the credit-opening rhetoric of bringing
homeownership to historically underserved communities under the civil-rights
these sources in his paper.).
12. Frank A. Hirsch, The Evolution of a Suitability Standard in the Mortgage Lending Industry:
The Subprime Meltdown Fuels the Fires of Change, 12 N.C. BANKING INST. 21, 23 (2008) (noting,
however, FDIC regulatory action enjoining lender from making loans without assessment of ability to
pay at fully indexed rate). Hirsch provides a lengthy collection of case law citations. Id.
13. Id; see also, e.g., Tenenbaum v. Gibbs, 813 N.Y.S. 2d 155, 156 (App. Div. 2006) ("Plaintiffs
have no distinct cause of action to recover damages for negligence because, as a mortgagee bank,
Eastern Bank did not owe any duty of care to ascertain the validity of the documentation presented by
the individual who falsely claimed to have authority to act on behalf of the borrower
corporation.");.Nymark v. Heart Federal Savings & Loan Assn., 231 Cal.App.3d 1089, 1093 n. 1 (1991)
("The relationship between a lending institution and its borrower-client is not fiduciary in nature. A
commercial lender is entitled to pursue its own economic interests in a loan transaction. This right is
inconsistent with the obligations of a fiduciary which require that the fiduciary knowingly agree to
subordinate its interests to act on behalf of and for the benefit of another.").
14. Hirsch, supra note 12, at 11-12 (citation omitted).
15. Mortgage regulation has a complex and institution-specific history in this country, dating back
well before the 1970s. This historical analysis is restricted to the 1980s and beyond to underscore the
significance of the 1982 changes.
16. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 12 U.S.C. § 371, §24(a)(1) (1974)
(repealed).
17. Gain-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320 (1982).
18. Title VIII of the Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96
Stat. 1469, 1545 (1982) (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 3801 et seq.). Another similarly spirited deregulatory
statute was the Depository Institutions Reregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
221,94 Stat. 132 (1980).
19. Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-128 (1977), Title VIII of the Housing
and Community Development Act of 1977, 91 Stat. 1147.
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era policies of the CRA.20 With traditional mortgage lenders liberated from
their "stodgy" underwriting standards, housing would come to everyone at
last!2
Post Gain-St. Germain, regulators basked in their newfound freedom.
History could have unfolded in one of two ways at this inflection point: (1)
regulators could have taken over to "fill the void" after the rollback and
promulgated an all-encompassing swath of regulation to discipline (or,
depending on one's priors, suffocate) the mortgage market in the post-LTV cap
environment; or, (2) regulators might have "gotten the message" and taken a
hands-off, light-touch approach, loath to impose regulations that could be seen
as mere re-treads of the now unfashionable LTV limits.
Regulators got the message. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
("OCC"), for example, considered using its rulemaking power over national
banks to craft new underwriting restrictions on mortgages (along the lines of,
e.g., a new LTV cap), but politely declined: "Decisions concerning the forms
and terms of national bank lending are properly the responsibility of each
bank's directorate and management.", 22 One by one, rules governing real estate
loan origination standards were systematically eliminated.23 The last to fall-
proscriptions on loans with an LTV ratio greater than 100% and those with
24longer than forty-year amortization terms-were finally repealed in 1996. In
less than two decades, mortgage lenders went from facing hard LTV caps to
facing discipline by the market alone, with all its attendant foibles.
25
There was some nominal backlash. In 1991, Congress jumped in and
required regulators to adopt uniform standards for real estate lending in the
20. This linking of the CRA with relaxed underwriting standards is a common bank lobbying move.
See infra note 2 1. Of course, an even more cynical account would be one of trying to save the thrifts
during a high-inflation period by facilitating "product innovation," such as adjustable rate mortgages. In
retrospect, encouraging thrift risk-taking may not been such a great idea. See FDIC, The S&L Crisis: A
Chrono-Bibliography,-http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/s&l/ (last visited May 25, 2011).
21. "Stodgy" here is used purposely because it was the characterization used by the ABA's Vice-
President and Senior Counsel for Regulatory Compliance at a lively recent speech. See Feddis, supra
note 3. Her gist was that the banks were faulted for being too "stodgy" in underwriting mortgages in the
1970s, but are now being mulcted in being too carefree. Moreover, as she pointed out, one man's
"suitability" could be another's "discrimination," if more rigorous underwriting standards effect a
disparate minority impact. The pejorative use of "stodgy" thus seems intended to downplay the benefits
from further stringency in underwriting standards (imposed by government regulation). Fair enough,
from a lobbyist's perspective, but one could equally characterize a compelled increase in underwriting
stringency as "prudential, crisis-averting cost internalization."
22. Real Estate Lending by National Banks, 48 Fed. Reg. 40,699 (Sept. 9, 1983) (codified at 12
C.F.R. pts. 7, 34).
23. An excellent summary of the regulatory history during this period is found in a current Working
Paper by Vincent DiLorenzo, The Federal Financial Consumer Protection Agency: A New Era of
Protection or Mode [sic] ofthe Same? (St. John Legal Studies Working Paper No. 10-0182 (2010)),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1674016.
24. See id. at 12.
25. The paradigmatic "20% downpayment" was thus historically the result of government
regulation, not a social thrift ethic.
Berkeley Business Law Journal
FDIC Improvement Act.26 This finally prompted the OCC to issue its Real
Estate Lending Standards.27 But again, a light-touch approach prevailed; the
OCC eschewed rules in favor of "guidelines" that included general admonitions
toward "prudential underwriting standards." 28 The Office of Thrift Supervision
("OTS") followed suit.2 9 Even with these interventions, moreover, the policy
impetus was a duty of "safety and soundness"-the underlying mandate for
depository institution regulation-not any duty to the borrower as the
beneficiary of some form of protective relationship. 30 Thus, even when goaded
by Congress into action, the agencies remained deep in the thrall of free-market
laissez faire that was the legacy of Gain-St. Germain.
How strong was their resistance to regulate (and how ill-conceived in
twenty-twenty hindsight)? Consider the aforementioned Real Estate Lending
Standards. The OCC specifically excluded as unrelated to the safety and
soundness of the underlying depository institution all loans that were "sold
promptly after origination." 31 (After all, what greater assurance to the safety
and soundness of a bank than getting a loan off its books through prompt
securitization? Who cares about those loans? What possible impact could they
have?)
32
Concomitant to this robust resurgence in caveat emptor starting in the
1980s was a rise in abusive mortgage practices. This run-up in unscrupulous
lending culminated in yet another congressional intervention: the Home
Ownership Equity Protection Act ("HOEPA") of 1994. 33 HOEPA allows the
Federal Reserve System ("the Fed") to regulate high-cost (i.e., subprime)
mortgage loans. As such, the Act's regulatory panoply chiefly descends only
upon loans that trip a high-cost trigger. For example, HOEPA applies to
26. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, § 304,
105 Stat. 2354 (1991). In the notice of final rulemaking for the uniform standards, the federal banking
agencies rationalized:
The legislative history of section 304 indicates that Congress wanted to curtail abusive real estate
lending practices in order to reduce risk to the deposit insurance funds and enhance the safety and
soundness of insured depository institutions. Congress considered placing explicit real estate lending
restrictions in the form of loan-to-value (LTV) ratio limitations directly into the statute. Earlier versions
of the legislation included specific LTV limits. Ultimately, however, Section 304 was enacted without
LTV limits, or any other specific lending standards. Instead, Congress mandated that the federal banking
agencies adopt uniform regulations establishing real estate lending standards without specifying what
these standards should entail.
Real Estate Lending Standards, 57 Fed. Reg. 62,890 (December 31, 1992) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 34).
27. Id. at 62,890.
28. Id. at 62,889.
29. Office of Thrift Supervision, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,951, 50,978, §§ 560.100-101 (Sept. 30, 1996)
(codified at 12 C.F.R. 545, 556, 560, 563, 566, 571, 590).
30. See, e.g., Home Owners' Loan Act, Pub. L. 101-73, Title Ill, § 301, 103 Stat. 277 (1989).
31. Real Estate Lending Standards, Supra note 26, at 62,896, 62,900.
32. Compare Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, § 1413(k)(1), 124 Stat. 2141 (augmenting assignee
liability).
33. Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) (1994), 15 U.S.C. § 1639 (amending the
Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1649, by adding Section 129 to TILA).
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refinancing loans (not purchase-money loans) only when the rate exceeds ten
percent above the like-duration U.S. Treasuries rate.34 HOEPA is of particular
interest to examining Dodd-Frank's ability-to-pay mandate because one of the
duties HOEPA imposes upon lenders whose loans trigger its scrutiny is
analysis of an "ability to repay"-but only, as interpreted, for lenders who are
shown to have engaged in a "pattern or practice" of asset-based lending, i.e.,
originating loans based on, at best, collateral appraisals alone or, at worst, the
incentive to generate fees.
35
HOEPA thus had some kick, but it was of limited effect. The Fed was only
given jurisdiction over lenders whose products triggered the high-cost loan
threshold; 36 the OCC and OTS continued to oversee their own depository
institutions. Each did pass its own set of regulations in 1996, but the regulatory
thrust was not in the direction one might have expected. For example, OCC's
big regulatory move was to confirm the permissibility of Adjustable Rate
Mortgages ("ARMs"), and then to announce federal preemption of that
decision over contrary ARM-banning state laws. 37 OTS, in turn, downgraded
many of its own regulations to "guideline" status, explaining almost
apologetically to those by whom it was well captured: "OTS will continue to
emphasize to examiners that guidance documents should not be confused with
regulations." 38 Thus, while there were some regulatory stirrings, doubtless
prompted in part by HOEPA, no meaningful change to mortgage
underwriting-or mortgage regulation-occurred during the 1990s.
By the turn of the millennium, however, the federal regulators took more
active notice. 39 In June 2000, the Treasury Department and the Department of
Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") issued a joint report on Curbing
Predatory Home Mortgage Lending, documenting the inadequate and
34. Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. Part 226 (2010) (amended by Riegle Community Development and
Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2160 (Truth in Lending, 60 Fed. Reg.
15,463 (March 24, 1995) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226)) implementing HOEPA (TILA, 75 Fed. Reg.
46,837 (Aug. 4, 2010) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226)) (HOEPA "sets forth rules for home-secured loans
in which the total points and fees payable by the consumer at or before loan consummation exceed the
greater of $400 or 8 percent of the total loan amount. In keeping with the statute, the Board has annually
adjusted the $400 amount based on the annual percentage change reflected in the Consumer Price Index
as reported on June 1. The adjusted dollar amount for 2011 is $592.").
35. TILA, 75 Fed. Reg. 46,837 (Aug. 4, 2010) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226).
36. The scope of HOEPA was tinkered with over the years, but the big change came in 2008,
contemporaneous with the negotiation of Dodd-Frank, in which the Fed extended HOEPA's reach to all
mortgage originators under a new national legal standard. See Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,522,
44,526 (July 30, 2008) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226).
37. Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 61 Fed. Reg. 11,294 (March 20, 1996) (codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 34) (final rule).
38. Lending and Investment, 61 Fed. Reg. 1,162, 1,163-64 (Jan. 17, 1996) (codified at 12 C.F.R.
pts. 545, 556, 560. 563, 571) (proposed rulemaking); Lending and Investment, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,951
(Sept. 30, 1996) 12 C.F.R. pts. 545, 556. 560, 563, 566. 571, 590 (final rule).
39. So did Congress. See, e.g., Predatory Mortg. Lending: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on
Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 107-774 (2001); Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Banking and Fin. Servs. on Predatory Lending Practices, 106th Cong. 24-49 (2000).
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gap-filled coverage of TILA, HOEPA, and the Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act ("RESPA") as statutory interventions for abusive mortgage
lending. 40 The joint report recommended reforms, including, quite specifically,
relaxing or repealing the restriction on HOEPA's asset-based lending ban to
only "pattern or practice" lenders-in other words, expanding the imposition of
a duty to analyze a borrower's ability to repay. 4 1 Furthermore, the OCC and
OTS finally joined the Fed and the National Credit Union Administration to
promulgate a set of interagency guidelines titled Interagency Guidelines on
Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks ("Subprime Lending Guidelines)". 
42
(State regulators, such as North Carolina, led the charge in applying pressure,
and one suspects this pressure made continued under-activity at the federal
level unsustainable.) 43 In these new Subprime Lending Guidelines, the
regulators begrudgingly admitted that much mortgage lending in the subprime
market was abusive, although they still insisted it was a problem only to the
extent that it imperiled the safety and soundness of regulated depository
institutions.
44
Significantly, and roughly contemporaneous with the drafting of the
40. HUD-Treasury Task Force on Predatory Lending, Curbing Predatory Home Mortgage Lending
(2000), available at http://www.huduser.org/publications/pdf/treasrpt.pdf. Many of the
recommendations of this report, if followed, may have mitigated or averted the housing market crisis.
41. Id. at 77-78. The joint report had numerous other recommendations, including working within
the HOEPA framework by changing its trigger threshold. See id. at 86-88.
42. Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks, 71 Fed. Reg. 58,609 (Oct. 4,
2006) (final guidance). Note these guidelines were passed on an effective interim basis; the final version
of the guidelines did not pass until 2007. See Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage
Products, 70 Fed. Reg. 77,249, 77,252 (Dec. 29, 2005) (proposed guidance). There were also earlier
guidances touching on the issue, such as, e.g., Press Release, FDIC, Expanded Guidance for Evaluating
Subprime Lending Programs (January 31, 2001), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press
/2001/pr0901a.html, which warned banks that originating unaffordable loans would be viewed by
supervising regulators as "imprudent."
43. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1F(c)(l) (2011) (requiring ability to pay analysis of so-called
"rate spread" loans). North Carolina also was an earlier mover on anti-flipping laws. See id. § 24-10.2(c)
(1999) (2011) ("No lender may knowingly or intentionally engage in the unfair act or practice of
'flipping' a consumer home loan. 'Flipping' a consumer loan is the making of a consumer home loan to
a borrower which refinances an existing consumer home loan when the new loan does not have
reasonable, tangible net benefit to the borrower considering all of the circumstances, including the terms
of both the new and refinanced loans, the cost of the new loan, and the borrower's circumstances. This
provision shall apply regardless of whether the interest rate, points, fees, and charges paid or payable by
the borrower in connection with the refinancing exceed those thresholds specified in G.S. 24-
1.1E(a)(6)."); see also Georgia Fair Lending Act, H.B. 1361 (2002) (prohibiting flipping a new home
loan within five years unless it provides a "tangible net benefit to the borrower"); California Assembly
Bill No. 489 (2001) (requiring covered loan originators to consider the consumer's ability to repay the
loan). Macey et al. conclude in a survey that "Colorado, Illinois, Maine, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania
all have at least some hint of [ability-to-pay, like 'suitability' requirements]." Jonathan R. Macey,
Geoffrey P. Miller, Maureen O'Hara & Gabriel D. Rosenberg, Helping Law Catch up to Markets:
Applying Broker-Dealer Law To Subprime Mortgage, 34 J. CORP. L. 789, 832 (2009).
44. Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Products, supra note 42 (proposed guidance)
("[O]ur concern is elevated with nontraditional products due to the lack of principal amortization and
potential accumulation of negative amortization. The Agencies are also concerned that these products
and practices are being offered to a wider spectrum of borrowers, including some who may not
otherwise qualify for traditional fixed-rate or other adjustable-rate mortgage loans, and who may not
fully understand the associated risks.").
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Subprime Lending Guidelines, the OCC and OTS in 2003 for the first time
embraced imposing a duty on lenders to analyze borrowers' "ability to repay"
mortgages, at least in the subprime market. 45 The OCC's Guidelines for
National Banks to Guard Against Predatory and Abusive Lending Practices
46
and Avoiding Predatory and Abusive Lending Practices in Borrowed and
Purchased Loans,47 both cautioned banks against-but did not prohibit them
from--issuing or buying mortgages made without analyzing the borrower's
ability to pay. A year later, these cautions ripened into regulations that
explicitly prohibited mortgages issued without the lender considering the
borrower's ability to pay.
48
The scope of these anti-predatory mortgage rules, however, was limited,
applying only to depository institutions and their subsidiaries; bafflingly, the
rules did not apply to their mortgage-originating affiliates until much later.
49
Moreover, the rules were promulgated in conjunction with a preemption
decision of state predatory lending laws, some of which were quite expansive
in their protection of mortgage borrowers, and so the net regulatory effect was
unclear. 50
Certainly the relaxation in credit by macroeconomic policy following the
early 2000s tech-bubble correction provided counter-pressure to attempts to
rein in mortgage credit. Thus, while the mid-2000s saw the first emergence of
an "ability to pay" duty imposed on mortgage lenders through regulation, it
seems to have been a half-hearted effort of considerable foot-dragging.5' For
example, the decision to omit the clearly mortgage-dominated "affiliates" of
banks and thrifts until 2006 from subprime mortgage lending regulations is
difficult to explain away as regulatory caution; the more likely narrative of a
45. The FTC also determined subprime loans made knowing debtors cannot rcpay arc unfair and
deceptive. See Ronald G. Isaac, Assistant to the Dir. of the Fed. Trade Comm'n Bureau of Consumer
Prot., Before the Cal. State Assembly Comm. on Banking and Fin. on Predatory Lending Practices in the
Home-Equity Lending Mkt. (Feb. 21, 2001) (prepared statement available at
http://www.ftc.gov/be/v0l0002.shtm) (cataloguing enforcement efforts over several years that included
a settlement with national subprime lender engaged in asset-based lending).
46. Guidelines for National Banks to Guard Against Predatory and Abusive Lending Practices,
OCC Advisory Letter 2003-2 (Feb 21, 2003) 7, http://www.occ.gov/static/news-issuanecs/memos-
advisory-lettcrs/2003/advisory-letter-2003-2.pdf.
47. Avoiding Predatory and Abusive Lending Practices in Borrowed and Purchased Loans, OCC
Advisory Letter 2003-3, (Feb. 21, 2003), http://www.occ.gov/static/news-issuanccs/mcmos-advisory-
lctters/2003/advisory-letter-2003-3.pdf.
48. Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 1904 (Jan.
13, 2004) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7. 34).
49. Id. at 1905 (applying the final rule to "national banks and their operating subsidiaries");
Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks, 71 Fed. Reg. 58,609, 58,610, n.3,
(Oct. 4, 2006).
50. Id. at 1908-11.
51. See. e.g., DiLorenzo, supra note 23, at 101 ("Enforcement actions have, however, rarely been
brought [by federal banking regulators] for originating or purchasing loans without regard to ability to
repay.").
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reluctant regulator has been noted even by the popular press. 52 Indeed, anyone
skeptical of a cynical account of regulatory capture by these federal mortgage
overseers should consider that Countrywide's decision to relinquish its bank
charter so it could relocate its regulatory oversight to the OTS from the OCC
was quite candidly explained as driven by the OTS's wisdom to interpret the
Subprime Lending Guidelines with more "restraint."
53
Finally, in the grand tradition of belated government action to crisis, only in
2008, after the housing collapse was well afoot, did the Fed amend TILA's
Regulation Z to ban high-cost HOEPA-esque loans (defined as ones with rates
over prime plus 1.5% for first liens) made without the lender analyzing the
borrower's ability to pay and verifying income and assets. 54 The 2008
Regulation Z amendment was significant because, even though limited to high-
cost mortgages that tripped its HOEPA-like trigger, it was not limited to
specific covered entities, such as depository institutions or their affiliates.55 All
mortgage lenders fell under its scope. (Since the amendments did not come into
force until October 1, 2009, however, they had no appreciable impact on the
housing market collapse.)
56
Understandably, Dodd-Frank's 2010 injunction on all mortgage
originators--of all mortgages-to consider a borrower's ability to repay the
loan was a watershed. 57 Not only did it cut through the crazy-quilt of OCC,
OTS, the Fed, and others by casting a uniform statutory duty on all mortgage
lenders, but, having seen the contagion from the subprime market to the Alt-A
market and beyond, it applied for the first time to all mortgage loans-a duty
irrespective of a complex (not to mention easily evaded) jurisdictional
trigger.58 "Ability to pay" had been adopted whole hog.59
52. Edmund L. Andrews, Fed and Regulators Shrugged as the Subprime Crisis Spread, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 18, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/I8/business/I8subprime.html.
53. Barbara A. Rehm, Countrywide to Drop Bank Charter in Favor of OTS, AM. BANKER, Nov. 10,
2006, at 1.
54. Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,522, 44,523 (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226) (July 30, 2008).
55. In fact, some amendments applied to all residential mortgages (not just high-cost ones), such as,
e.g., the proscription against coercing real estate appraisers to inflate valuations. See Truth in Lending,
supra note 36, at 44,522-23.
56. Opponents to Dodd-Frank predictably claimed that the Regulation Z amendments should be
allowed time to take effect before Congress "rush" to statutory intervention. "Last July, the Federal
Reserve issued new regulations under the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act ... . As part of
this implementation, new Federal rules have been developed which address predatory practices and
products .... But rather than allowing the Fed's carefully constructed regulations to take effect, this new
majority has decided to draft their own mortgage reform bill with their own unique twist. Unfortunately,
this twist includes new and untested mandates and duties, that even if they can be implemented, they
may end up punishing the very consumers that this majority party is trying to protect." Ill Cong. Rec.
H5175, H5177 (daily ed. May 6, 2009) (Remarks of Rep. Sessions), available at http://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/CREC-2009-05-06/pdf/CREC-2009-05-06-pt1 -PgH5I74-3.pdf.
57. States appeared ahead of this regulatory curve. Minnesota, for example, passed a statute
requiring analysis of ability to pay (and verification of income) of all loans. See 2007 Minn. Laws Ch.
18, §58.13(l)(a)(23).
58. Note the jurisdictional trigger survives today embedded within Dodd-Frank's definition of
"qualified mortgages." See Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, at 2145-50, discussed in Part 11, infra.
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"Suitability ": Analogues Outside the Mortgage Regulation World
Review of the fitful development of the ability-to-pay duty might suggest
that it was a foreign concept to American law. That assumption would not be
true. The requirement to gauge a borrower's ability to pay is in fact similarly
spirited to "suitability" requirements found in securities regulation (and other
areas). 60 Broker-dealers, even when not full-fledged fiduciary investment
advisers, owe their clients a duty to recommend only "suitable" investments,
mindful of the client's particular circumstances.
61
HOEPA has had a tumultuous enforcement history. For example, in 2001, the Fed amended TILA to
address consumer advocates' complaints that creditors were structuring high-cost loans as open-ended
home equity lines expressly to evade HOEPA requirements. See Truth in Lending, 66 Fed. Rcg. 65,604,
65,614-15 (Dec. 20, 2001) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226) ("[Section] 226.34(b) explicitly prohibits
structuring a mortgage loan as an open-end credit line to evade HOEPA's requirements, if the loan does
not meet the TILA definition of open-end credit .... Where a loan is documented as open-end credit but
the features and terms or other circumstances demonstrate that it does not meet the definition of open-
end credit, the loan is subject to the rules for closed-end credit, including HOEPA if the rate or fee
trigger is met."). Still, the charge that HOEPA's triggers were too easily evaded remained:
"Unfortunately. at the same time, HOEPA has had little success in eliminating those abusive practices it
identifies. As consumer advocates have been arguing for years, HOEPA's points and fees triggers are
simply too high. As a result, very few subprime loans -- less than one percent in 1999 - fall within
HOEPA's points and fees trigger and are subject to regulation. Predatory lenders have successfully
managed to conduct the bulk of their abusive activities using rates just below the HOEPA triggers but
still high enough to provide enormous room for exploitation and profitability."
Baher Azmy. Squaring the Predatory Lending Circle: A Case for States as Lahoratories oj
Experimentation. 57 FLA. L. REV. 295, 355-56 (2005): see also Christopher Peterson, Federalism and
Predatory Lending: Unmasking the Deregulatory Agenda, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 59 (2005) (bemoaning
that HOEPA failed to prevent "most abusive costs associated with predatory mortgages" and offering
example that "mortgage lenders commonly exclude yield spread premiums from calculation of the
HOEPA points and fees trigger").
59. The all-encompassing reach of Dodd-Frank renders the continued relevance of HOEPA's
triggers unclear. That is, if only high-cost loans fall under HOEPA's purview, but all loans are now
subject to the Dodd-Frank ability to pay duty, then at least that aspect of HOEPA is redundant.
Bizarrely, Dodd-Frank itself amended parts of HOEPA's (seemingly redundant) high-cost loan
definitional triggers. At a recent conference on consumer enforcement under Dodd-Frank, I asked a
regulator about this (off-record) and was met with the worldly response that yes, Dodd-Frank did reveal
some legislative inelegance and redundancy.
60. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 requires insurance products to be "suitable and
appropriate for the consumer." Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102 (1999), Subtitle C, 113
Stat. 1422-24. The act required a majority of states to enact reciprocal laws or uniform laws governing
the licensure of individuals and entities authorized to sell and solicit insurance no later than three years
after its enactment date. States could satisfy the uniformity requirement when they "established uniform
criteria to ensure that an insurance product ... sold to a consumer is suitable and appropriate for the
consumer." If after three years a majority of states had failed to enact uniform or reciprocal licensing
laws, then the National Association of Registered Agents and Brokers would have been established to
carry out multi-state licensing, but a majority did so enact so this nationalizing threat never realized. See
National Association of Insurance Commissioners, NAIC Producer Licensing Assessment Aggregate
Report of Findings (Feb. 19, 2008) 2, available at www.naic.org/Releases/2008_docs/produccr_
licensing assessment report.pdf.
61. See Hirsch, supra note 12, at 21-24 ("Suitability is a concept recognized in the securities law
that imposes a duty on a securities broker to sell only securities to a buyer that are 'suitable' for the
buyer based on the buyer's financial wherewithal, tax status, investment objectives and other factors.").
The suitability obligation is only triggered when the securities broker-dealer recommends a specific
purchase; the obligation is not present when the broker is given an order of self-directed trading. Id. at
26-27, 29. Some have argued, however, that the duty should expand to encompass brokers acting in any
capacity given the implicit expectations of clients. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Brokers as
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This suitability duty has a long pedigree, tracing back to the 1930s. The
Maloney Act of 1938 charged the SEC to register self-regulating securities
agencies, such as the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD"), in
order "to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices." 62 NASD
Rule 2310, passed in 1939, in turn imposes an obligation regarding non-
institutional clients to obtain information on the customer's financial status, tax
status, investment objectives, and "such other information used or considered to
be reasonable by a [broker-dealer] in making recommendations to a
customer.' 63 (Thus were born the check-boxes we enjoy when opening a
brokerage account.) Other kindred entities followed suit; for example, the New
York Stock Exchange's ("NYSE"') Rule 405, while not explicitly cast as a
suitability rule, is referred to as the "Know Thy Customer Rule" and has been
interpreted to require a suitability analysis.
64
The SEC itself has not explicitly passed a suitability rule, although its
practices have been to read one into its general anti-fraud proscription and its
broad injunction of "fair dealing.' 65 Relatedly, the SEC has, with a few
exceptions, 66 eschewed direct ex ante regulation in favor of case-by-case
adjudication to delineate a suitability standard incrementally. 67 Moreover, the
case-by-case adjudication of suitability does not even occur at the SEC; it
actually occurs primarily through NASD self-discipline (i.e., FINRA
arbitrations), 68 albeit with occasional SEC direct enforcement against wayward
broker-dealers. 69 A private right of action for suitability is also implied under
Fiduciaries, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 439 (2010).
62. Maloney Act, Pub. L. 75-719, 52 Stat. 1070 (1938) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 78o)
(authorizing the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission to register national securities associations).
63. NASD Conduct Rule 2310 (formerly Article Ill, Section 2 of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice).
64. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), Regulatory Notice 09-25, Suitability and
"Know Your Customer" Proposed Consolidated FINRA Rules Governing Suitability and Know-Your-
Customer Obligations, (May 2009), at n.5, available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@
ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/pI 18709.pdf.
65. SEC, Guide to Broker-Dealer Registration (2008), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/
bdguide.htm.
66. Those few exceptions included the SECO Rule for Non-NASD brokers that governed before
mandatory registration was passed in 1983, which required "reasonable grounds to believe ... [a]
recommendation is not unsuitable for such customer," 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b10-3, as well as Rule 15c2-5
on margin trading, see id. § 240.15c2-5. The SEC does have what might be considered "indirect" cx ante
suitability regulations, such as the categorical exclusionary effects of the accredited investor rules of
Regulation D, see id § 230.501, §§ 230.505-506, and more specifically Rule 15g-9's restrictions on
trading in penny stocks, see id. § 240.15g-9, http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-51983.pdf, but for the
most part has declined promulgating direct ex ante rules squarely on topic.
67. See Macey et al., supra note 43, at 839.
68. FINRA, Arbitration & Mediation Rules, available at http://www.finra.org/Arbitration
Mediation/Rules. Suitability violation is actually pled quite frequently in arbitration claims. See Stephen
J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch, and Adam C. Pritchard, Attorneys as Arbitrators, 39 J. LEG. STUD. 109, 123 (2010)
(finding suitability violations pled in 49,76% of arbitrations). For a cogent analysis of the business costs
of suitability monitoring, see Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of
Corporate Compliance with Law, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 71, 95-98 (2002).
69. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 891, § 10(b) (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1958);
see also, e.g., SEC v. Ainsworth, No. EDCV 08-1350 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2008) (SEC suit against group
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securities law, but this right has not been known to generate landmark
awards. 70
Accordingly, although the SEC's suitability standard has not been
elaborated through regulation, it has developed over time with a rich
interpretative history. Not only has that history shown the content of the
standard but also its deep-seated paternalism. Consider, for example, that it has
been determined to be no defense to a suitability violation to plead disclosure;
unsuitable investment recommendations are categorically prohibited, regardless
of what the broker tells the client. 7 1 This paternalism reveals that while
suitability is most avowedly not a fiduciary duty, it is, like a duty to analyze
ability to repay, a strong abrogation of caveat emptor.
Given this lengthy history of usage in the securities arena, it is perhaps
unsurprising that this quasi-fiduciary concept of suitability was on the minds of
many leading up to the passage of Dodd-Frank. Indeed, one of Dodd-Frank's
precursors, the would-be Borrower's Protection Act of 2007, went so far as to
propose that "[i]n the case of a home mortgage loan, the mortgage brokers shall
have a fiduciary relationship with the consumer, and each such mortgage
broker shall be subject to all requirements for fiduciaries otherwise applicable
under State or Federal law." 72 The Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory
Lending Act of 2007 (which mostly found its way into Title XIV of Dodd-
Frank) ended up taking a more modest approach, avoiding the contentious
concept of suitability and instead suggesting tweaks to the "high-cost loan"
trigger for HOEPA in order to expand its regulatory reach over problematic
mortgages.73 Expressly bowing to the charged nature of suitability and not
wanting a fight, House sponsor Representative Barney Frank assured, "We felt
a suitability standard was too vague . . . .We don't want to give people an
of securities brokers alleging they sold unsuitable securities to customers with little formal education,
poor English fluency, and insufficient funds to purchase the securities recommended by defendants
absent refinancing).
70. See Macey et al., supra note 43, at 817 (2009) ("SEC and federal courts have found broker-
dealers personally liable for suitability violations under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and
SEC Rule 1Ob-5, under which private rights of action are implied."); cf Sparta Surgical Corp. v. Nat'l
Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 159 F.3d 1209, 1213 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding a party has no private right of
action against an exchange for violating its own rules); Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 681
(9th Cir. 1980) (holding that SRO suitability rules do not create a private right of action); Katheleen
Engel & Patricia McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80
TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1316, 1338-39 (2002) (describing how "low and uncertain damage awards" reduce
the number of suitability cases and that punitive damage awards are capped at $11,000 under FHA
limits).
71. See In re Stein, S.E.C. Release No. 47335, 79 SEC Docket 1777 (Feb. I1, 2003), 2003 WL
431870, at *2 ("Registered representative does not satisfy the suitability requirement simply by
disclosing the risk of an investment that he or she has recommended.").
72. Borrower's Protection Act of 2007, S. 1299 § 2, 110th Cong. (2007).
73. See Dodd-Frank, 124. Stat. 2157-60, § 1431. Note these HOEPA-altering provisions remained
in the law. See also Legislative Proposals on Reforming Mortgage Practices: Hearing on H.R. 3915
Before the H. Fin. Servs. Comm., 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Marc Savitt, President-Elect, Nat'l
Ass'n of Mortgage Brokers) (discussing suitability).
Berkeley Business Law Journal
obligation that is too vague and obscure because you can scare people away
from doing anything. We think these [proposals] are less subjective than
suitability."
74
Similarly, the Final Guidance on Subprime Mortgage Lending from 2007
(implementing the Subprime Lending Guidelines, discussed above) made clear
that while the participating agencies were passing specific regulations
proscribing certain lending practices,7 5 they were most unequivocally not going
to embrace suitability:
The Agencies disagree with the commentators who expressed concern that the
proposed statement appears to establish a suitability standard under which lenders
would be required to assist borrowers in choosing products that are appropiate to
their needs and circumstances. The commentators argued that lenders are not in a
position to determine which products are most suitable for borrowers, and that this
decision should be left to borrowers themselves. It is not the Agencies' intent to
impose such a standard, nor is there any language in the Statement that does so.
76
The final pre-enactment draft of Dodd-Frank, while eschewing suitability
outright, did get close. In addition to shouldering lenders with the affirmative
duty to analyze ability to repay that is the subject of this article, it even sought
to propose a specific "net tangible benefit" test for refinancing loans, building
up the plausible theory that loans saddled on debtors who cannot repay them
confer no actual benefit.
77
While this net tangible benefit requirement was left on the cutting room
floor to ensure passage at the last minute, the surviving ability to pay
requirement captures most if not all of the content of that rule. (Some have
argued that suitability and ability to pay are wholly different concepts, 78 but
that is debatable.)
79
74. Binyamin Appelbaum, Frank's Bill Seeks Rules for Lenders, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 23, 2007,
http://www.boston.com/business/personalfinancc/articles/2007/10/23/franks bill-seeksrules for lende
rs/ (quoting Representative Barney Frank).
75. Statement on Subprime Mortgage Lending, 72 Fed. Reg. 37,569 (July 10, 2007).
76. Id. at 37,572.
77. See Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 2007, H.R. 3915, 110th Cong. sec.
202, § 129B(b)(I)-(b)(3) ("No creditor may extend credit in connection with any residential mortgage
loan that involves a refinancing of a prior existing residential mortgage loan unless the creditor
reasonably and in good faith determines, at the time the loan is consummated and on the basis of
information known by or obtained in good faith by the creditor, that the refinanced loan will provide a
net tangible benefit to the consumer."), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-
IlOhr3915ch/pdf/BILLS-l10hr3915ch.pdf. As discussed supra note 43, the net tangible benefit
requirement persists at state law..
78. See Macey et al., supra note 43, at 832, 836-37 (borrower's ability to repay is a necessary but
not sufficient condition of suitability). Bankers' lobbyists fear both. See Duncan, supra note 21, at 127
(opposing ability to pay rules as "too prescriptive") and 140 (opposing suitability standards as "too
subjective").
79. To be sure, the latter is technically a constitutive factor of the former, but in the context of a
residential mortgage, it is surely the lion's share of the relevant consideration. Requiring lenders to
gauge a borrower's ability to repay creates enough quasi-fiduciary obligation that the marginal
imposition of, say, an additional assessment of the suitability of a fixed or adjustable-rate mortgage
(both of which have already been found affordable) seems negligible. Accordingly, much of the work of
suitability standard is already achieved through the ability to pay duty.
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Thus, it was not just the regulatory trial balloons in the mortgage oversight
realm that gave rise to the Dodd-Frank ability to pay duty; securities law played
a rich parallel role, too.
80
Foreign Cognates
A duty to consider ability to pay, while perhaps late-coming to the
American scene, has existed in other countries' laws for some time. France, for
example, has prohibited banks to advise borrowers to assume more debt than
they can repay, and even has a quite specific thirty-three percent debt service
cap on disposable income. 8 1 Denmark, which has been singled out for praise by
the International Monetary Fund ("IMF") for its stable mortgage market
regulation, passed a 2003 Mortgage-Credit Loans and Mortgage-Credit Bonds
Act, capping residential, owner-occupied mortgages at eighty percent LTV.82
Others, too, have been galvanized by the mortgage crisis. For example, the
Canadians in October 2008 changed minimum standards for government-
backed mortgages (mortgages with less than twenty percent down-payments,
for which the government mandates mortgage insurance) to impose upon the
lender a "reasonable effort to verify that the borrower can afford the loan
payment."'83 Additionally, in February 2010, the Canadian government lowered
the permissible principal amount a homeowner can take out in refinancing such
80. Interestingly, some creative litigants have sought to advance suitability duties for mortgage
brokers by extending state unfair/abusive practices laws. See, e.g., Tingley v. Beazer Homes Corp., 2007
WL 1902108 (D.N.C. April 25, 2008); Leff v. EquiHome Mortgage Corp., 2007 WL 2572362 (D.N.J.
Sept. 4, 2007);.
81. The French Model: Vive la diffcrence! The French Way of Doing Things Looks Pretty Good-
at Least in These Troubled Economic Times, THE ECONOMIST (May 7, 2009); see also Financial
Stability Board, Thematic Review on Mortgage Underwriting and Origination Practices Peer Review
Report 9 (Mar. 17, 2011) (French law summary), www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/
r 110318a.pdf
82. Mortgage-Credit Loans and Mortgage-Credit Bonds Act, unofficial English translation (2003),
§ 5(l), available at http://www.finanstilsynet.dk/upload/Finanstilsynet/Mediafiles/newdoc/Acts/Act454
_100603H.pdf. Denmark used to be the darling of mortgage regulation analysts by having MBS's
comply with its famous "balance principle," which required matching the underlying mortgage security
dates to the term of the securities issues. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, DENMARK: FINANCIAL
SECTOR ASSESSMENT PROGRAM - TECHNICAL NOTE - THE DANISH MORTGAGE MARKET - A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 5 (2007). To comply with the EU Capital Requirement Directive, however,
Denmark passed a revised mortgage act in 2007, U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of Economic, Energy and
Business Affairs, 2011 Investment Climate Statement - Denmark, (April 2011),
http://www.state.gov/e/ecb/rls/othr/ ics/2011/157267.htm, which gave lenders the option to choose
compliance with the existing specific pass-through balance principle or a more general, "flexible"
balance principle that essentially vitiated the strict coverage requirement. Harmonization enthusiasts
should be careful what they wish for. For a detailed analysis of the differences between these two
specific and general balance principles, see Realkreditraadet, Association of Danish Mortgage Banks,
General and Specific Balance Principle, http://www.realkreditraadet.dk/DanishMortgageModel/
General and specificbalanceprineiple.aspx.
83. Press Release, Annette Robertson, Press Sec'y, Office of the Minister of Fin., Government of
Canada Takes Action to Strengthen Housing Financing - Backgrounder, (Feb. 16, 2010) (available at
http://www.fin.gc.ca/n I 0/data/10-011 _I -ng.asp).
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a mortgage from ninety-five percent to ninety percent. 84 In the most populous
province of Ontario, moreover, provincial regulators went even further by
adopting in 2008 an express suitability standard for mortgage brokers, which
requires consideration of "the needs and circumstances of the borrower," as
well as the implementation of procedures and practices to ensure "the
suitability of a mortgage.. . for a borrower."
' 85
Australia went beyond a mere duty to analyze ability to repay to an even
broader affirmative duty of "responsible lending" in its National Consumer
Credit Protection Act of 2009. 86 This duty includes an obligation to assess
"whether the credit contract will be unsuitable for the consumer if the contract
is entered or the credit limit increased. 87 Australia's suitability duty expressly
requires consideration of the likelihood the consumer will be unable to comply
with the financial obligations of the contract or whether compliance will
engender "substantial hardship" on the consumer. 88
Australia's invocation of a duty of "responsible lending" implicates a hotly
contested policy debate that has been brewing in Europe for some time. There,
several civil jurisdictions place fiduciary-like responsibility squarely on
lenders. For example, Germany recognizes "sittenwidrige Uberschulduing"
(immoral overburdening with debts) in its domestic law, 89 and Sweden's
Consumer Credit and Banking Act bans the extension of credit to borrowers
who cannot be expected to repay, allowing a private remedy of "debt
adjustment" by the borrower for violation. 90  These strong consumer
protections, by way of saddling arms-length lenders with affirmative duties to
consider the needs of borrowers, helped ground a movement at the European
Union ("EU") level to revise its Consumer Credit Directive to impose upon
member states standardized policies of policing lending practices. 9' (This
project ultimately ended up excluding mortgage products from its scope, but
they in turn faced their own regulation, as discussed below.)
The initially proposed EU Consumer Credit Directive, floated in 2002, had
a "responsible lending" section that contained an obligation to gauge a debtor's
84. Id.
85. Ontario Regulation 188/08, enacted pursuant to Mortgage Brokerages, Lenders and
Administrators Act, 2006, § 24, available at http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/html/source/regs/english
/2008/claws srcregs r08188 e.htm#BK29.
86. National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Austl.), available at http://
www.comlaw.gov.auLDetails/C2009A00134.
87. Id. at Ch. 3, Part 3-1, Div. 4, § 1 16(l)(b), Ch. 3, part 3-2, Div. 3, § 129(b).
88. Id. at Ch. 3, Part 3- I, Div. 4, § II 8(2)(a), Ch. 3, part 3-2, Div. 3, § 131 (2)(a).
89. See Udo Reifner et al., CONSUMER OVERINDEBTEDNESS AND CONSUMER LAW IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION, 100-01 (2003).
90. Id. at 100.
91. See Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on
Credit Agreements for Consumers and Repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/Result.do?T I =V3&T2=2008&T3=48&RechTypc=RECH naturel&Submit=Search.
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ability to repay. 92 This concept met marked opposition from the United
Kingdom ("UK"), which in commentary expressed "doubts about the value of a
'responsible lending' provision."9 3  Consequently, the next draft in 2005
whittled down this duty to become one of only "advising" and "providing
adequate information," 94 with an explicit admonition that the borrower bears
ultimate responsibility for deciding what credit is appropriate.
95
When the credit collapse hit, however, the UK's resistance to burdening
lenders with purportedly unfair duties lost punch; thus, the final version of the
Directive, as enacted in 2008, while employing vaguer language than the initial
draft, unquestionably shifts most responsibility back to the lender: "Member
states should take appropriate measures to promote responsible lending
practices .... ,, 96 Expanding, the Directive chides, "It is important that
creditors should not engage in irresponsible lending or give out credit without
prior assessment of creditworthiness ..... 97
In March 2011, the European Commission followed up on the Consumer
Credit Directive with its carved-out proposal for a Directive on Credit
Agreements Relating to Residential Property. 98 The proposal "requires the
creditor to assess the consumer's ability to repay the credit," clarifying that if
the "consumer's creditworthiness results in a negative prospect for his ability to
repay the credit over the lifetime of the credit agreement" the creditor must
refuse credit. 99 This mortgage lending proposal builds upon the practices of
many member states. A 2009 Public Consultation, for example, catalogs how
Austria, Belgium, Hungary, Ireland, Malta, and the Netherlands already require
suitability assessments of mortgage products based on the consumer's personal
circumstances. 1•o
The proposed Mortgage Directive of the European Commission, however,
92. See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
harmonization of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning
credit for consumers, at 15-6, 40, COM (2002) 443 final (Sept. 11, 2002), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.cu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2002:0443:FIN:EN:PDF.
93. Dep't Trade & Indus., PROPOSAL FOR AN EC CONSUMER CREDIT DIRECTIVE -
SUPPLEMENTARY CONSULTATION 5, 13 (2006), available at http://www.dti.gov.uk/filcs/file27459.pdf.
94. See Modified Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Credit
Agreements for Consumers Amending Council Directive 93/13/EC, at 2, 6, 31, COM (2005) 483 final
(Oct. 7, 2005) (stating that it is only necessary to consult databases "where appropriate"), available at
http://ec.europa.cu/consumers/cons-int/fina-serv/cons-directivc/2ndproposal-en.pdf.
95. Id. at 6.
96. Directive, supra note 91, § 26.
97. Id.
98. European Commission, PROPOSAL FOR A DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF
THE COUNCIL ON CREDIT AGREEMENTS RELATING TO RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY (March 2011), available
at http://ec.curopa.eu/internal market/ftnservices-retail/docs/credit/mortgage /com2011 _142_en.pdf.
99. Id. at I1, 35. Article 5(l) mandates that credit providers act "in accordance with the best
interests of the consumer," which sounds fiduciary. Id. at art. 5(l).
100. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, PUBLIC CONSULTATION ON RESPONSIBLE LENDING AND
BORROWING IN THE EU, 7 n.17 (June 2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/intemal market/
consultations/docs/2009/responsiblelending/consultation-en.pdf.
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is at once both expansive and vague. In terms of the scope of ability to pay, it
capaciously counsels consideration of "all necessary factors that could
influence a consumer's ability to repay . . . including, but not limited to, the
consumer's income, regular expenditures, credit score, past credit history,
ability to handle interest rate adjustments, and other existing credit
commitments."''1 1 It further demands acquisition of "necessary information
regarding the consumer's personal and financial situation, his preferences and
objectives."' 1 2 On the other hand, whether that translates into specific rules is
left up to each country: "Member States may issue guidance on the method and
criteria to asses a consumer's creditworthiness, for example by setting limits on
loan-to-value or loan-to-income ratios.' 10 3 Furthermore, a suitability-like duty
arises in a provision that requires the lender to "identify products that are not
unsuitable for the consumer given his needs, financial situation and personal
circumstances." 1
0 4
The Europeans thus have not only had suitability (and even fiduciary
duties) imposed on their lenders for some time, they are clearly strengthening
and expanding those duties in EU-wide responses to the economic crisis.
Indeed, even the UK, a previous holdout, has apparently had second thoughts
on the efficacy of market discipline alone. In a Financial Services Authority
("FSA") Discussion Paper of 2009 on Mortgage Market Review, an
"Affordability Assessment Model" was put forward to require lenders to assure
credit be extended only to homeowners who could afford repayment. 10 5 The
Model further imposes an obligation to verify affordability by calculating the
borrower's "free disposable income" that is available for debt service.l°6 FSA
backed off, however, from suggestions for more rule-based limits, such as a
hard LTV cap or debt-to-income ("DTI") cap on residential mortgage loans.1
0 7
FSA's Mortgage Market Review of 2010 confirmed this affordability approach
101. PROPOSAL, supra note 98, at Pmbl. 24.
102. Id. at art. 14(4); see also id. at art. 17(b) (requiring gathering of "necessary information" on
"personal and financial situation, preferences and objectives so as to enable recommendation of suitable
credit agreements"). Article 17(a) even mandates lenders to consider a "sufficiently large number of
credit arrangements." Id. at art. I 7(a).
103. Id. at Pmbl. 24.
104. Id. at art. 14(5). The Proposal implcments the suggestion of the 2010 Working Paper
preceding the proposal that "the creditor ... should thoroughly assess the suitability of credit contracts
for the consumer's personal and financial circumstances on the basis of sufficient information, where
appropriate obtained from the consumer." Responsible Mortgage Lending and Borrowing 9 (European
Commission Working Paper, 2010), available at http://www.fininc.cu/gallery/documents/efin-
news/work-papcr-resp-lending-2010-07-22.pdf. Unlike "hard" suitability under U.S. securities law,
however, the Working Paper envisions an insistent consumer being able to proceed with an unsuitable
credit contract after express disclosure, warning, and written waiver - waiveable ("soft") suitability, but
suitability nonetheless. Id. at 8-9. The Proposal seems to have shut this down. See PROPOSAL, supra note
98, at art. 29(1) ("[C]onsumers may not waive the rights conferred on them by... this Directive.").
105. FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, DISCUSSION PAPER 09/3 MORTGAGE MARKET REVIEw 51
(October 2009), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/dp09 03.pdf.
106. Id. at 12.
107. ld. at 11, 37.
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and even considered stricter rules for "credit impaired" borrowers, such as a
twenty percent "buffer" in calculating free disposable income. 
1 08
Finally, quick mention should be given to other international approaches to
mortgage market regulation, such as the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision ("Basel"). Because the mortgage meltdown had global systemic
ramifications, Basel also became involved in offering recommendations for
banks. 10 9 Minimum underwriting standards, including repayment capacity
analysis, effective income verification, and "appropriate" LTVs, have all been
included in Basel's suggestions, although with nowhere close to the specificity
found in many domestic proposals. "1
0
This brief comparative law overview shows how some countries have had
ability to pay, suitability, and even full-throated responsible lending duties
imposed upon mortgage credit providers for some time. 11 It also reveals a
convergence of concepts and terminology. The panic-inducing collapse of
global mortgage markets may well have herded countries toward a harmonizing
regulatory path, where a duty to ensure ability to repay no longer seems
innovative but commonplace. While it would likely be overstatement to
contend that we are witnessing the emergence of a harmonized global standard,
it is fair to observe that what seems like a shocking innovation to U.S.
consumer law may be nothing more than the U.S. catching up (or, some would
argue, being led astray) to where most other developed mortgage markets
already are.
Academic Support
Finally, just as Elizabeth Warren agitated for a consumer financial
protection agency for some time, 112 so too have academics kept the pressure on
for some form of suitability or similar duty on mortgage lenders. Kathleen
Engel and Patricia McCoy (the latter of whom is now tapped to run one of the
CFPB's mortgages units) 13 win the salience award for their 2002 Texas Law
Review article, in which they propose "a duty of suitability in subprime
108. FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, CONSULTATION PAPER 10/16 MORTGAGE MARKET
REVIEW 9, 28 (2010), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cpl0 16.pdf.
109. JOINT FORUM, REVIEW OF THE DIFFERENTIATED NATURE AND SCOPE OF FINANCIAL
REGULATION - KEY ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2010), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/
joint24.htm.
110. ld.atl5-7.
11. Some countries have even broader consumer protection laws that are so protective that
suitability would appear subsumed. See, e.g., Consumer Protection Act, 2008, Ch. 2, Part G (S. Afr.)
("Right to fair, just and reasonable terms and conditions.").
112. See Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, 5 DEMOCRACY 8 (2007), available at http://www.
democracyjoumal.org/pdf/5/Warren.pdf.
113. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Press Center, Treasury Department Announces
Senior Hires for CFPB Implementation Team (Feb. 17 2011) (McCoy hired as Assistant Director for
Mortgage and Home Equity Markets), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tgl070
.aspx.
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mortgage lending.""114 Making their case, Engel and McCoy "draw upon
suitability in securities and insurance" to explain that the "new duty of
suitability puts the onus of preventing predatory lending on those who can
afford it most cheaply (i.e., predatory lenders and brokers) by authorizing the
federal government and aggrieved victims to sue for loan reformation,
disgorgement, and damages."" 5 Note that even Engel and McCoy were not so
bold as to suggest blanket application of suitability to the entire mortgage
market-as Dodd-Frank does-but just to the subprime market. (It is amazing
what an intervening global economic collapse will do.) Their focus on private
remedies to enforce newly placed duties on lenders mirrored other agitants'
cries demanding more dramatic remedies to combat the "reckless lending"
infecting the consumer credit markets. 116
Engel and McCoy were not alone. Daniel Ehrenberg also advocated
suitability, borrowing more directly from securities law. 117 Some even made
the argument that suitability could (and should) be attached under current
securities law, under the theory that mortgage sales could be seen as
transactions "in connection with" the purchase and sale of securities."18 In
addition to like-minded supporters, there were also the critics, such as Todd
Zywicki and Jack Guttentag, the latter of whom snorted, "Nobody makes loans
known to be unaffordable at the outset except collateral lenders . . .and
perpetrators of fraud.""t 9 One of the more bizarre critiques came from Anthony
Yezer, who protested that a suitability standard would be tough for the average
bank because loan officers would need to have committed to memory hundreds
of their products to discharge this duty effectively. ' 20 (Even leaving aside the
likelihood that a broker-dealer surely needs familiarity with a similar number of
114. Engel and McCoy, supra note 70, at 1259.
115. Id.
116. Veto Countryman, Improvident Credit Extension: A New Legal Concept Aborning?, 27 ME. L.
REV. 1, 17-18 (1975); see also John A. E. Pottow, Private Liability for Reckless Lending, 2007 U. ILL.
L. REV. 405,408.
117. Daniel S. Ehrenberg, If the Loan Doesn't Fit, Don't Take It: Applying the Suitability Doctrine
to the Mortgage Industry to Eliminate Predatory Lending, 10-WTR J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY.
DEv. L. 117, 125-27 (2001).
118. See Macey et al., supra note 43, at 792, 809, 813 (arguing, inter alia, subprime mortgage
might be a "note" for securities law purposes (and not a mere "debt") under the so-called Reves test
because "we believe that some mortgages have crossed the line between financial vehicles used to
finance personal consumption (which are not securities) and financial instruments with significant
investment components that should be categorized as notes regardless of the fact that there is a
consumption component involved").
119. Jack Guttentag, Suitability Standards Could Carry Unintended Consequences, WASH. POST,
Mar. 31, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/30/AR2007033001016
.html; see also, e.g., Todd Zywicki and Joseph Adamson, The Law & Economics of Subprime Lending,
80 U. COLO. L. REV. 1,78 (2009).
120. See Ending Mortgage Abuse: Safeguarding Homebuyers: Hearing Before the Sen. Subcomm.
on Hous., Transp. and Community Dev. of the Sen. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 109th





investment products to discharge his suitability duty, and the fact that securities
law has not collapsed under the weight of such a rule, one is left wondering just
how non-repeat mortgage borrowers would be better situated to memorize such
offerings than their loan officers.) 121 Finally, Richard Posner contributed his
requisite chime-in, arguably signaling conclusion of the intellectual
discussion. 122
Thus, Dodd-Frank's ability-to-repay duty can be seen not just as an
acceleration of the gradual change working its way through the field of extant
U.S. mortgage regulations that was triggered by the unprecedented housing
market collapse, but as the product of a convergence of intellectual pressure
from domestic regulators, state legal entrepreneurs (such as North Carolina), 1
23
non-mortgage regulators in the securities field, foreign jurisdictions, and
academic commentators.
ANALYSIS: WHAT WILL IT ACTUALLY LOOK LIKE?
Dodd-Frank offers remarkable specificity in many aspects. Consider, for
example, the highly detailed, timeline-setting deadlines for the passage of
specific regulations. 24 By contrast, there is little guidance in the statute on just
how this landmark duty to analyze ability to pay should be enforced. For
example, in the UK, regulators expressed serious reservation about how to
implement sets of these provisions, particularly the "inflexibility" of imposing
strict caps on LTV and DTI to bar certain types of loans. 125 On the other hand,
121. Engel and McCoy also note the inherent regressivity of such an argument, pointing out that
because "suitability is appropriate for financial instruments that have been the traditional province of the
affluent, certainly it is appropriate for financial instruments that are peddled to the poorest rung of
society." Engel & McCoy, supra note 70, at 1319.
122. Richard A. Posner, Treating Financial Consumers as Consenting Adults, WALL ST. J., July 22,
2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424052970203946904574302213213148166.html.
123. This article has avoided an extensive survey of state laws, other than a brief comment, supra,
at note 43. For a good discussion of state-level innovations, see Hirsch, supra note 12, at 30-33, who
describes, e.g., Colorado as imposing a "quasi-fiduciary duty" on mortgage brokers. See also Engel &
McCoy, supra note 70 at 1299-1305 (discussing state law remedies for predatory lending).
124. See Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, at 2136, § 1400(c) (regulations under Title XIV become
effective twelve months after the Board issues final regulations and guidelines and the Act requires the
Board to issue final regulations within eighteen months after the transfer date); see also 75 Fed. Reg.
57,252-53 (Sept. 20, 2010) (transfer date is July 21, 2011, when 'consumer financial protection
functions' currently carried out by the Federal banking agencies, as well as certain authorities currently
carried out by the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Federal Trade Commission,
will be transferred to the CFPB"); Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, at 2148, §1412(3)(ii) (HUD, Dept. of
Agriculture, Dept. of Veterans Affairs and the Rural Housing Service shall in consultation with the
[Federal Reserve] Board prescribe rules defining the types of loans they insure, guarantee or administer
that are qualified mortgages for the purposes of the safe harbor provision). On the transfer date,
"consumer financial protection functions" carried out by Federal banking agencies, HUD and FTC will
be transferred to the CFPB; specifically the CFPB will "assume responsibility for consumer compliance
supervision of very large depository institutions and their affiliates and promulgating regulations under
various Federal consumer financial laws" and "take steps to implement the risk-based supervision of
nondepository covered persons." 75 Fed. Reg. 57,253.
125. See supra text accompanying note 107.
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within the HOEPA framework, there is ready willingness to set very specific
numerical rules, right down to the jurisdictional trigger. 26 How should we read
between the statutory lines with Dodd-Frank? For instance, is the expansion of
the duty to analyze a borrower's ability to pay to all loans (rather than just
high-cost ones) an implication that Congress wants the reach of regulation to be
as broad and as strict as possible?
Legislative Guidance
The relevant commands of the statute itself are intriguing. They begin with
a general injunction of barring loans that are underwritten without analyzing
the borrower's ability to repay. 127 This broad exhortation is followed by a
statutory list of mandated factors to consider, which includes the:
consumer's credit history, current income, expected income the consumer is
reasonably assured of receiving, current obligations, debt-to-income ratio or the
residual income the consumer will have after paying non-mortgage debt and
mortgage-related obligations, employment status, and other financial resources
other than the consumer's equity in the dwelling or real property that secures
repayment of the loan. 12
8
This is a comprehensive-sounding list, to be sure, but one that actually
requires no specific weighting of any of its constitutive elements. Moreover,
the statutory specificity continues even down to the next level of
implementation, where the duty to verify income is in turn micromanaged
regarding which documents to requisition: W-2s, tax returns, payroll receipts,
etc. 129 Countless other examples abound of this statute-level detail, such as
how to account properly for an ARM or non-fully amortizing loan in working
the ability to repay analysis. 130
Perhaps most significantly, the statute also provides a presumption to
implement the ability to repay duty, in a section captioned, "Safe Harbor and
Rebuttable Presumption." Section 1412 amends (as amended!) TILA section
129C after subsection (a) with a new subsection (b):
(b) Presumption of Ability to Repay.-
(1) In General.-Any creditor with respect to a residential mortgage loan, and any
assignee of such loan subject to liability, may presume that the loan has met the
requirements of subsection (a), if the loan is a qualified mortgage.
(2) Definitions.-.
(A) Qualified Mortgage.-[defining the term over a page of statutory text,
126. See supra text accompanying note 34; see also Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, at 2146-47,
§1412(2)(c), 124 Stat. 2157-60, §1431.
127. See Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, § 1402, 124 Stat. 2142, § 1411.
128. Id. at 2143, § 129C(a)(3). One virtue of the comprehensiveness of this list is that its flexibility
to consider future income dispatches many of the horribles oaraded by detractors. See, e.g., Zywicki,
supra note 119, at 79 (presenting example of medical resident on the cusp of transformative salary
increase).
129. Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, § 129C(a)(4).
130. Id. at 2144, § 129C(a)(6).
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including in relevant part: "(vi) that complies with any guidelines or regulations
established by the Board in relation to ratios of total monthly debt to monthly
income, alternative measures of ability to pay regular expenses after payment of
total monthly debt, taking into account the income levels of the borrower and such
other factors as the Board may determine relevant and consistent with the purposes
described in paragraph (3)(B)(i)."] 131
Note that this highly detailed statutory definition is in turn followed by a
broad re-definition authority conferred in the subsequent subsection:
(3) Regulations.-..
(B) Revision to Safe Harbor Criteria.-The Board may prescribe regulations that
revise, add to, or subtract from the criteria that define a qualified mortgage upon a
finding that such regulations are necessary or proper to ensure that responsible,
affordable mortgage credit remains available to consumers in a manner consistent
with the purposes of this section, necessary and appropriate to effectuate the
purposes of this section and section 129B to prevent circumvention or evasion
thereof, or to facilitate compliance with such sections."1
32
Making sense of this interpretative presumption is difficult. At first blush, it
seems a back-door resurrection of the excised "plain vanilla" rules that sought
to privilege certain forms of standard form mortgages (by according safe
harbor) over others.' 33 That is, by defining qualified mortgages to exclude
negative-amortizing mortgages, ones with certain high balloon payments, etc.,
Dodd-Frank effectively privileges the residuum by according them a rebuttable
presumption of demonstrated ability to repay. It is not complete safe harbor
from statutory scrutiny, to be sure, but exemption (or, more precisely,
rebuttable exemption) from one of its more significant and transformative
requirements. On the other hand, the privilege is perhaps a hollow one, because
in the multi-pronged definition of "qualified mortgage" lies the express
criterion of compliance with the Fed's (or CFPB's) guidelines and regulations
relating to DTI, which surely stands in as a regulatory proxy for ability to
pay. 134 Thus, mortgages that have a demonstrated ability to pay under the Fed's
131. Id. § 1412, 124 Stat. 2145-46. Note that, cruelly, "Qualified Mortgages" are expressly
distinguished from "Qualified Residential Mortgages." The latter come from the sexpartite multi-agency
"Risk Retention Rules" that were promulgated in initial proposed form on March 31, 2011. In requiring
sponsors and securitizers of asset-backed securities to retain five percent of the credit risk for each
securitization transaction, the regulators propose exempting issuances that entirely comprise "qualified
residential mortgages." Credit Risk Retention by Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Department of Housing and Urban Development, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal
Housing Finance Agency, Office of the Comptroller of Currency, Securities and Exchange Commission,
144-45 (March 31, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 244) (proposed rulemaking), available al
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2011/prl 1062.html. While the definition of "qualified residential
mortgage" is stringent, rule-based and includes an "ability to pay" requirement (twenty-eight percent
"front end" mortgage DTI and thirty-six percent total "back end" DTI), id. at 20, 127-30, 144-45, that
definition "should not be interpreted in any way as reflecting or suggesting the way in which the
Qualified Mortgage standards under TILA [per Dodd-Frank] may be defined either in proposed or final
form." id. at 103-04.
132. Dodd-Frank, supra note I, § 1412(b)(3), 124 Stat. 2148. On the transfer date, the authority
over safe harbor criteria will go to the CFPB. See id. § 1061 (b), 124 Stat. 2036.
133. See supra note 3, at 9-10.
134. See Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, § 1412(b)(2)(A), 124 Stat. 2145-46.
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guidelines are rebuttably presumed to have an ability to pay!
Perhaps this is not gibberish. For example, were the Fed to decline to issue
any DTI guidelines at all, then the safe harbor would presume ability to pay for
otherwise qualified mortgages, and hence the privileging would be doing some
work. But if we anticipate a subversive Fed trying to undermine the Act
through refusal to pass DTI guidelines, why would such a Fed not just exercise
its regulatory power to define "qualified mortgage" more broadly to exempt
everything, as it clearly has power to do under section 1412(b)(3)(B)? In sum,
it is not clear the enabling legislation provides much in the way of helpful
guidance regarding delineation of ability to pay.
Kindred Regulations
Limited but nevertheless useful insight on how to interpret ability to pay
can also be gleaned from the regulations just promulgated under CARD that
seek to provide guidance on that statute's duty to assess "ability to pay."'1 35 The
Fed took its crack with Proposed Rules in October 2009 and followed up with
Final Rules in February 2010. The regulations provide credit card lenders with
a safe harbor if they assess repayment following certain assumptions, including
that the full line of credit is drawn for new accounts and that the "real" APR
(not the teaser rate) is applied. Note, however, that the regulations do not
assume any fees are incurred, other than mandatory ones such as annual
membership fees, for fear they are "too speculative,"' 136 and the inclusion of
annual fees only came as a compromise after protest over the "no fees" aspect
of the Proposed Rule.1 37 Safe harbor under CARD does not require verification
of income, assets, etc., as is mandated under Dodd-Frank, because according to
the Fed, such a requirement is "burdensome," especially for telephonic
applications; plus there is "no evidence," the Fed insists, of income-inflating
liar loans in the credit card market. 138 Most toothlessly, alas, the ability to pay
analysis only requires scrutiny of the ability to make the minimum monthly
payment, not (as suggested by one commentator on the Proposed Rules)
scrutiny of payment that amortizes the loan within a reasonable period of time.
This omission is grounded in part on statutory text of the specific "ability to
pay" provision in CARD. 139 (This lender leniency is perhaps why one banking
135. Truth in Lending, 74 Fed. Reg. 22,948 (March 18, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226)
(final rulemaking), available at http://www.federalreservc.gov/newsevents/prcss/bcreg/20110318b.htm.
Note that additional insight apparently cannot be gleaned - by regulatory command - from the new
"Qualified Residential Mortgage" provisions of the inter-agency Risk Retention Rules. See supra note
131.
136. Truth in Lending, 74 Fed. Reg. 54,124, 54,127, 54,160-61, 54,125-26 (Oct. 21, 2009)
(codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226) (proposed rule), Truth in Lending, 75 Fed. Reg. 7658, 7660, 7721-22,
(Feb. 22, 2010) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226) (final rule).
137. 75 Fed. Reg. 7722.




lobbyist praised CARD's ability to pay regulations as having "worked OK,
with some tweaks.")
140
One recurrent comment after the Proposed Rules came out was for "more
guidance" on just how to measure ability to pay. This resulted in the Fed's
inclusion in the Final Rule of two interesting additions. First, at the prodding of
consumer advocates, numerical ratios were injected: lenders must now
"consider" the borrower's debt-to-income ratio, debt-to-assets ("DTA") ratio,
or "residual income" (defined as the income left after the debtor services debt,
but not living expenses, so perhaps this is "quasi-net income"), although there
is no specific trigger of what might constitute an excessive ratio. 141 Second, at
the pushing of industry, the Fed will allow the use of "reasonable policies and
procedures" to estimate a borrower's "obligations" in assessing ability to pay,
including income and asset estimates based on "empirically derived,
demonstrably and statistically sound models."' 142 The Fed's discussion of the
rules reveals strong lobbying and a clear aversion by industry to conduct
individual borrower analysis beyond credit score review, modeling, and other
quantitative algorithms. 143 (One worries about reliance on statistical models
after the financial collapse of 2008, but maybe the Fed envisions a brave new
world of even bigger, more unsinkable, models.) It is interesting to note that
these rules were being finalized during the final jockeying over Dodd-Frank,
which may explain the incorporation of greater specificity into that statute's
text tracking wording from the Fed's regulations interpreting CARD (e.g.,
"residual income").
Whether and to what degree these CARD regulations will help shed light
on Dodd-Frank remains to be seen. Indeed, even the revisions to the rules were
insufficient guidance for some, requiring a still further set of "clarifying"
amendments that came down in March 2011, dealing with such down-in-the-
weeds detail as how to define "household income."' 44 To the extent that this
moving target can be tracked, it certainly seems consistent with further
140. See Fcddis, supra note 3.
141. 75 Fed. Reg. 7660. "Residual income" is used elsewhere in federal housing regulation, such as
by the Dept. of Veterans Affairs ("VA") in its underwriting standards for VA loans. See Foreclosure
Prevention and Sound Mortgage Servicing Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hous. & Cmty.
Opportunity, H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., lI0th Cong. 110-108 (2008) (statement of Judith Cadcn,
Director, Loan Guaranty Service, Dept. of Veterans Affairs) ("Lenders underwriting VA loans must
ensure that the contemplated terms of repayment bear a proper relation to the veteran's present and
anticipated income and expenses, and that the veteran is a satisfactory credit risk. VA's credit standards
employ the use of residual income guidelines and debt-to-income ratios in determining the adequacy of
the veteran's income."). For a good discussion of this construct, see John Eggum, Katherine Porter &
Tara Twomey, Saving Homes in Bankruptcy: Housing Affordability and Loan Modification, 2008 UTAH
L. REV. 1123, 1136.
142. 75 Fed. Reg. 7660, 7718, 7720.
143. Cf Ruth Simon, Banks Get Back to the People Business, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 2011, at CI
(discussing return to "character analysis" in loan underwriting in addition to numerical scoring).
144. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Truth in Lending, 107, 111 (Mar. 18,
2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226) (final rulemaking).
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emphasis on highly specific rules, a topic explored in more depth immediately
below.
Rules or Standards?
What about the perennial rules vs. standards debate? In lobbying against the
imposition of a suitability standard, the Mortgage Bankers Association warned
against the perils of a "subjective" standard of suitability, taking the position
(as a back-up to rejecting the suitability standard altogether) that were a federal
intervention made, it would have to be "clear and objective," 145 i.e., a rule. 146
Yet at the same time it lobbied against subjectivity in opposing a standard such
as suitability (and, by analogy one assumes, ability to repay), the Mortgage
Bankers Association also railed against the dangers of a DTI ceiling of forty-
five percent 147 Some rules are apparently better than others. Section 1412 of
Dodd-Frank clearly indicates that the Fed could indeed say a borrower with a
DTI above forty-five percent lacks ability to pay, and so perhaps the most
significant interpretative impact of the qualified mortgage rebuttable
presumption of ability to pay is not so much its content (which could be
rendered meaningless) but its explicit countenancing of specific rules, such as
DTI caps. Indeed, it is that possible approach that so frightened regulators in
the UK. 148 and perhaps explains the Europeans' ambivalence. 149 As discussed
just above, the CARD regulations seem to be grasping toward requirement that
include "consideration" of rule-like DTI formulas, but in a watered-down sense
that allow a modeling bypass.
Accordingly, a highly plausible conjecture is that as Dodd-Frank unfolds,
we will see the proliferation of many specific rules and formulas that in turn
will be revised over time. ' 50 That is, in prognosticating on the rules-standards
continuum, rules will rise ascendant. This prediction stems from a culmination
of factors: first, the specific cue in Section 1412 to embrace such rules as a DTI
145. Hirsch, supra note 12, at 27 (quoting lobbying positions).
146. It also insisted that any mortgage reform not entail a private right of action as a remedy,
although one fails to see how this follows from its insistence on objectivity over subjectivity. See id.
147. Id.
148. The 45% DTI ratio comes from, in part, proposals from consumer advocacy groups. See, e.g.,
Paul Leonard, Cal. Office Dir., Ctr. for Responsible Lending, Remarks before Cal. State S. Banking,
Fin. & Ins. Comm. 12 (Mar. 5, 2008), available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-
lending/policy-legislation/states/final-3-05-08-senate-banking-testimony-on-fed-rules-final.pdf. Some of
these proposals are discussed in Hirsch, supra note 12, at 26.
149. See supra text accompanying note 103.
150. This prediction is fully mindful of the explicit disassociation by the CFPB's proto-head. See
infra note 155. That may well be her intention, but she will have to reverse a tide of rule-enthusiasm. For
the latest manifestation of such rule-enthusiasm, see Credit Risk Retention supra note 13 1, at 20, 127-30
(multi-agency release specifying the "risk retention rules" under Dodd-Frank, which exempt "qualified
residential mortgage" securities from the Dodd-Frank five percent retention requirement; "qualified
residential mortgages" in turn are defined as loans with a mortgage DTI ratio of no more than twenty-
eight percent and total DTI ratio of no more than thirty-six percent).
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ratio; 151 second, the proliferation of prohibitory rules already in the Statute
(e.g., ban on prepayment penalties for unqualified mortgage,152 ban on
mandatory arbitration for residential mortgage loans under an open-end,
consumer credit plan, 153 etc.); third, the conceptually contagious "niggling"
provisions of the express statutory text, such as Section 129C's insistence on
which types of tax documents to examine in underwriting a debtor's loan;
154
fourth, baseline hyperactivity of newly created and newly invigorated federal
agencies; 155 and finally, bureaucratic hindsight conviction that the recent
housing collapse might have been avoided had we simply retained rules like the
pre-1982 hard LTV caps on residential mortgages. One can even envision
categorical bans of certain products (the analogy of the accredited investor rule
from securities law's Regulation D comes to mind). 156 The power of the Fed to
expand and contract the definition of a "qualified mortgage" as it sees fit surely
suggests the lesser power to pass such categorical rules banning products it sees
as generating an inherent risk of inability to pay. And rules and categories
certainly seem popular with the swath of regulations rolling out under Dodd-
Frank. 157 Although the normative debate of preference for rules or standards in
regulating residential mortgages is not one suited for the present discussion,
158
151. Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, § 1412(b)(2)(A)(vi), 124 Stat. 2146. Technically, one might
envision a Fed regulation banning an "unreasonable DTI" (i.e., a standard), but that borders on silly.
Then again, in interpreting CARD, the Fed only requires vague "consideration" of DTI. See Credit Risk
Retention, supra note 131, at 108.
152. See Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, § 1414(a)(c)(I)(A)-(B), (a)(c)(3) 124 Stat. 2149-50.
153. See Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, § 1414(e), 124 Stat. 2151.
154. Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, § 129C(a)(4), 124 Stat. 2143.
155. The activity level of an agency will depend on its head, a point emphasized by many. See, e.g.,
Wright, supra note 11 (emphasizing criticality of CFPB's first director). Elizabeth Warren, one possible
contender, has made clear she has no intention of a regulatory binge if at the helm of the CFPB.
Embracing a position of the Financial Services Roundtable, Warren opines,
"Instead of creating a regulatory thicket of 'thou shalt nots,' and instead of using ever-more-complex
disclosures that drive up costs for lenders and provide little help for consumers, let's measure our
success with simple questions ..... Instead of layering on regulations that don't fully protect consumers,
a better approach would focus on how to give consumers the power to make the right choices for their
families - and, at the same time, to case the regulatory burden for the lenders."
Shahien Nasiripour, Elizabeth Warren Extends Olive Branch, Borrows Idea From Lenders in First
Major Speech, HUFFINGTON POST, Sept. 29, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/09/29/
olizabeth-warren-financial-services-roundtablen_744619.html (reporting on prepared remarks to the
Financial Services Roundtable from September 2010).
156. See supra note 66. Note that the proto-CFBP head, at least in some contexts, appears to like
categorical rules. "It is impossible to buy a toaster that has a one-in-five chance of bursting into flames
and burning down your house. But it is possible to refinance an existing home with a mortgage that has
the same one in-five chance of putting the family out on the street." Warren, supra note 112, at 8.
157. The March 31, 2011 Risk Retention Rules, see supra note 131, while explicitly impermissible
to rely upon in interpreting the mortgage lending ability to pay rules, do provide interesting insight on
the presence of categorical distinctions in analyzing ability to pay. For example, the rules expressly
counse that ability to pay should be scrutinized differently for an automobile loan (current income and
DTI) than for a business loan (liabilities, leverage, and coverage ratios). Id. at 150-52, 161-62.
158. Vincent DiLorenzo offers interesting analysis on whether Dodd-Frank signals an end to what
he contends was the disastrous "principles-based" standards approach that prevailed after 1982. He sees
Dodd-Frank as clearly "two steps forward" toward the resurgence of rules, but also feels the quasi-cost-
benefit constraint on generating new regulations, see Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, § 1031, 124 Stat. 2005-
Berkeley Business Law Journal
it is worth quickly noting that the proto-head of the CFBP, while at times
having expressed interest in rules, has gone on record in agreeing with banking
industry leaders on the need to have flexible regulatory standards. 1
59
Sister Statutory Fields
How else might an "ability to pay" duty be operationalized? One area that
confronted this problem recently is bankruptcy law, where the 2005
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code under the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention
and Consumer Protection Act ("BAPCPA") mandated an "ability to pay"
screen for Chapter 7 (liquidation) bankruptcy through revised 11 U.S.C. §
707(b). '60 There, Congress took two approaches to measuring ability to repay
debts in the bankruptcy context: a gross income screen and a net income screen.
For gross income, the statute deems bankrupt debtors unable to repay their
debts as a matter of law if they earn less than the applicable state median gross
income. 161 For net income, the statute specifies a highly detailed and routinized
test of permissible budgetary expenses that is largely driven by IRS guidelines
used by field agents negotiating repayment schedules with tax delinquents.1
62
What the brief experience of BAPCPA to date has taught us, however, is that
even a highly routinized "means tests" crafted by ex ante rules can create a
maelstrom of ex post litigation. For example, in the few years since its effective
date, already three means test statutory disputes have required Supreme Court
intervention. 
63
This ominous BAPCPA lesson could lead to several possible outcomes.
First, it might embolden the Fed to seize upon per se gross income rules,
deeming some products categorically off limits for certain income
demographics (or categorically permissible for others). Second, it could be
ignored (or passingly acknowledged) by a resolute Fed ready to bite the bullet
06, as "a step backward" toward standards. DiLorenzo, supra note 23, at 62-66, 81-83. Interestingly,
Engel and McCoy too prefer rules to standards, arguing that the concept of suitability in the securities
laws context (which found outlet in standards) would transpose poorly to mortgages. See Engel &
McCoy, supra note 70, at 1343-44.
159. See supra note 156. Warren's comments are presumably intended as an olive branch to the
lending industry, but it is not clear whether standards are preferable to rules by the regulated entities.
Maybe they think standards provide plausible deniability for captured regulators? It seems equally
likely, as a theoretical matter, that they might actually prefer the certainty of brighter rules.
160. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-08, §
707, 119 Stat. 27 (2005).
161. Id. § 707(b)(6)-(7); cf § 707(b)(3) (re-imposing judicial scrutiny for means-test passers under
certain circumstances).
162. Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(l)-(V) ("The debtor's monthly expenses shall be the debtor's applicable
monthly expense amounts specified under the National Standards and Local Standards, and the debtor's
actual monthly expenses for the categories specified as Other Necessary Expenses issued by the Intcmal
Revenue Service .... ").
163. See Ransom v. FIA Card Services, N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716 (2011); Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S.
Ct. 2464 (2010); Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. US, 130 S.Ct. 1324 (2010).
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of crafting net income rules.164 Note that the UK, for all its insistence on not
wanting to have hard-and-fast rules like LTV or DTI caps, apparently believes
it will be able to police an obligation on lenders to calculate "free disposable
income," a number that includes deductions for "committed expenditures for
the borrower's and borrower's dependents (income tax, national insurance,
utility bills, alimony and maintenance payments, school fees) as well as
personal expenditures (food, clothing, health and personal care, transport,
recreation and holidays)."' 165 As such, the Fed might use the UK as a guinea pig
in coming up with its own BAPCPA-like list of deductions in getting to the
appropriate "income" that grounds the ability to pay analysis. (It is also, of
course, possible that the Fed learns the ultimate BAPCPA lesson and tries to
fob everything off to the IRS.)1
66
Complicating Considerations
Complicating the analysis of what ability to pay regulation will look like is
the issue of preemption. Weighing in on a long-fought battle, 167 Dodd-Frank
makes clear that federal preemption of state consumer protection laws is lifted;
federal law is to become a "floor" from which more consumer-protective states
are free to depart upward. 68 This raises the prospect that some practices that
survive categorical proscription at the federal level may nevertheless be banned
by specific states (so long as they do not create an actual conflict).
169
Compounding this potential confusion is the restriction on remedies. One of the
fighting lines in the battle over Dodd-Frank was the creation of a private right
of action for consumers, which was resolved in favor of industry by generally
164. This seems unlikely based on the experience of the new CARD amendments to Regulation Z.
See supra note 135, at 108. There, the Fed initially suggested that lenders be required to consider a
debtor's "obligations" in gauging ability to pay in its proposed rules, but when pressed for more
guidance in the final rules, simply suggested "consideration" of specific financial ratios, such as DTI,
DTA, or something called "residual income," which was defined as income after service of debts (and is
better thought of as "quasi-net income").
165. Mortgage Market Review, supra note 105, at 16, 23. Fannie and Freddie automated
underwriting systems, which provide perhaps some basis of measuring ability to pay, but one might
reasonably have diminished confidence in the output of these institutions.
166. Note that either path would be consistent with a prediction of rules-enthusiasm.
167. See Wattcrs v. Wachovia Bank, 550 U.S. 1 (2007).
168. See Dodd-Frank, supra note I, § 1041, 124 Stat. 2011.
169. It is difficult to overstate the co-federalism significance of Dodd-Frank. The Attorney General
of Indiana recently remarked in public comments that state regulators are conscious of the significant
role they will be expected to play in co-enforcing the new financial reform laws. See Hon. Greg Zoeller,
Attorney General of Indiana, Remarks at the 2011 Marquette Law School Public Service Program: New
Directions in Consumer and Community Financial Protection (Feb. 25, 2011). Legal writing is emerging
too on this topic. See, e.g., Lauren Saunders, The Role of the States Under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Nat'l Consumer Law Ctr. (2010) (analyzing Dodd-
Frank's explicit invocation of state co-enforcement of federal consumer protection laws and restricted
preemption of state consumer protection laws), available at http://www.nclc.org/imagcs/pdf/
legislation/dodd-frank-role-of-the-states.pdf.
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omitting such relief. 170 But the new preemption rule now implies a state could
permit its own consumer protection laws that do allow private rights of action
to persist and grant consumers newfound powers, liberated from the yoke of
federal preemption. 171 (Indeed, Dodd-Frank's resurrection of assignee-liability
suggests that even more putative defendants will be added to the mix than
perhaps previously imagined.)1
7 2
The final aspect of this wildcard is the rollback of mandatory arbitration. 1
73
Not only will many matters of dispute now reach court for public, media-
attracting resolution, but the full judicial powers of preclusion and precedential
effect will attach. Accordingly, while myriad rules will spew from the
regulatory maw in upcoming years, we cannot ignore the possibility that the
relevant the interpretation of those rules (or similar, stronger state ones) will
effectively be transferred to, or perhaps even hijacked by, the courts. (Imagine,
as one scenario, a resurgence of the heady 1960s unconscionability caselaw.)1
74
In final analysis, then, notwithstanding the preemption and private action
wrinkles, the most likely implementation of the new ability to pay duty will be
a proliferation of constantly updating rules emanating from the Fed and CFPB.
Naysayers, of course, predict whatever comes out will be indecipherable: "We
have such nebulous terms as 'reasonable ability to repay."' 175 But those are
cheap shots. There is ample evidence for an active regulator that will
promulgate a swath of (hopefully coherent) rules. 1
76
170. This is a crude generalization. Some significant private causes of action survive and are
enhanced under Dodd-Frank. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, § 1404, 124 Stat. 2141 (creating cause
of action against mortgage originators that violate § 129B ofTILA, a prohibition on steering incentives);
§ 1413, 124 Stat. 2148-9 (allowing defense by recoupment or setoff to residential foreclosure by
asserting creditor violated prohibition on steering incentives or ability to pay standard); § 1414(e), 124
Stat. 2151 (prescribing that no residential mortgage loan term can waive a statutory cause of action or
bar a consumer from bringing an action for damages or relief in connection with any alleged violation of
Title XIV provisions). For discussion of the private action battle, see Hirsch, supra note 12, at 27. That
said, a private cause of action for general violations of the statute is neither express nor implied.
171. Indeed, many state "unfair and deceptive acts and practices" statutes ("UDAPs") provide for
private causes of action, unlike the FTC Act. See NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, UNFAIR AND
DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES (7th ed. 2008). Engel and McCoy discuss the uses of these statutes in
combating predatory lending. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 70, at 1303-05. For an example of a
recovery, see, e.g., Leff, supra note 80 (unsuitable mortgage for eighty-two-year-old homeowner
violated state UDAP).
172. See Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, § 1404, 124 Stat. 2141.
173. See Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, § 1414(e), 124 Stat. 2151.
174. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture, 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965); see also
Hirsch, supra note 12, at 36-42 (discussing private litigations seeking relief against lenders for
"unsuitable" mortgages).
175. 111 Cong. Rec. H5182 (2009), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2009-05-
06/pdf/CREC-2009-05-06-pt1-PgH51 79-2.pdf (Rep. Hensarling).
176. As discussed above, suitability standards have been around for decades in securities law, and
somehow that system has survived. The rich empirical research of talking to a colleague who is
knowledgeable in securities law revealed the dirty secret that the FINRA arbitrations are actually quite
useless in crafting standards for "suitability," because the generalist arbitrators are usually poorly versed
in underlying securities laws and norms.
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COMMENT: WHAT DOES IT ALL MEAN?
Whatever its form of implementation, the question arises whether
shouldering banks with a requirement to assess their customers' ability to pay
will be all that big a deal. It will. This is so both for the actual doctrinal effect
as well as the broader conceptual and expressive significance. The actual
doctrinal effect will unfold through the effective nationalization of
underwriting standards that the Fed and CFPB will exercise under their new
regulatory powers. 177 This could well be a return to 1982. The broader
conceptual leap (as we saw with the UK's crumbling resistance to "responsible
lending") lies in dispatching the fictions that acquiring a suitable mortgage is
fully up to the borrower alone, and that assessing its rightful fit is up to him
alone too as an arms-length contractual counterparty. Relatedly, the duty to
analyze the borrower's ability to repay constitutes recognition of the failure in
relying upon market forces alone to discipline lenders (i.e., admitting the
natural profit motives of lenders did not assure the extension of credit to
repayment-likely borrowers).
A duty-an affirmative mandate imposed by the state-now lies on
mortgage lenders to assure their erstwhile contractual adversaries can pay back
their loans. The imposition of this new, proto-fiduciary duty fundamentally
changes the landscape of how we understand the debtor-creditor relationship in
the consumer realm. This transfornation is significant, but it comes of course
with two possible consequences: first, an increased paternalistic regulatory
mindset (pejoratively, the rise of the "nanny state"), and second, a reduction or
rationing of mortgage credit.
Lest there be any doubt, paternalism was Epithet Number One hurled at
Dodd-Frank in the battles over its passage. As one opponent railed, "This is
Uncle Sam telling you, with a couple of exceptions, if you can't qualify for a
30-year fixed mortgage, then we are going to deny you the homeownership
opportunity in America, because we are smarter than you. We know better than
you. We have to protect you from yourself."' 178 Condemned another, "That is
not the American Dream; that's the Government Dream."'179 The title of one
prominent jurist's Op-Ed said it all: "Treating Financial Consumers as
Consenting Adults."'
80
177. A co-participant at a recent conference on the CFPB gets credit for the insight that ability to
pay is effectively a compulsory underwriting term.
178. 145 Cong. Rec. at H5182 (statement of Rep. Hcnsarling).
179. Id. at H5183 (statement of Rep. Neugebauer).
180. Posner, supra note 122. In what he presumably considers hyperbole, Posner rhetorically
questions regarding prepayment penalties, "[M]ortgages that include such penalties compensate by
charging a lower interest rate. Is the choice among such alternatives really beyond the cognitive
competence of the average home buyer?" The FTC has some insight on that question. In a recent study,
it found sixty-eight percent of respondents could not identify whether a mortgage disclosure statement
revealed that the underlying mortgage contained a prepayment penalty, and only five percent, having
found it, could identify what that penalty amount was. See James M. Lacko & Janis K. Pappalardo, Fed.
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Dodd-Frank is paternalistic-highly so. Supporters can squirm at this
attribute as a necessary evil, distract critics with the Panglossian distinction
between "libertarian" and "ordinary" paternalism, 18' or otherwise try to deflect
this charge by changing the subject. But the better approach is to confront it
head on and celebrate the law's inherent paternalism. 182 After all, the evil (for
those who see it as an evil) of paternalism lies in reducing the autonomy and
dignity of private contracting actors. 83 But if the market is malfunctioning,
184
and especially if the basis of that malfunction is in part deception, then the
autonomy concerns largely evaporate.185 Moreover, with autonomy concerns
set aside, the instrumentalist benefits of using the lenders as the policy targets is
clear. 186 (As for the sub-debate of "hard" vs. "soft" paternalism, 87 one can
nudge the reader into considering the emerging draft of the EU Directive on
Responsible Mortgage Lending. Under that proposal, at least in its first
iteration, mortgage lenders will be burdened with a suitability duty toward their
borrowers, but the duty may be waiveable with sufficient disclosure.)
188
Trade Comm'n, IMPROVING CONSUMER MORTGAGE DISCLOSURES: AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF
CURRENT AND PROTOTYPE DISCLOSURE FORMS 78-79 (2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
os/2007/06/P025505MortgagcDisclosurcReport.pdf.
181. See Posncr, supra note 122 ("Mr. Thaler, whose views are taken seriously by the Obama
administration, calls himself a 'libertarian patemalist.' But that is an oxymoron. He is a paternalist with
a velvet glove-as the agency will be.").
182. For one article doing so, see Mechelc Dickerson, Vanishing Financial Freedom, 61 ALA. L.
REV. 1079, 1119 (2010) ("If greater financial freedom means giving people unlimited choices and the
unfettered opportunity to go deeper into debt, then less financial freedom and fewer choices would be
better for many people because it would make them happier and ultimately increase their well-being.").
183. For a nice roundup of Kantian concerns, see Scana Valentine Shiffrin, Paternalism,
Unconscionability Doctrine, and Accommodation, 29 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205, 220 (2000), which
discusses concern that paternalistic legal interventions accord "insufficient respect for the underlying
valuable capacities, powers, and entitlements of the autonomous agent."
184. Note too that the economics of the subprime market are fiercely contested. For example, in a
scholarly debate on the merits of regulatory intervention, both Engel & McCoy and Zywicki &
Adamson lay greater claim to Stiglitz & Weiss's informational asymmetries, see Joseph E. Stiglitz &
Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 393
(1981). Compare Engel and McCoy, supra note 70, at 1258, 1278, 1280-84 (claiming) with Zywicki and
Adamson, supra note 119, at 71, 73, 78-82 (counterclaiming). The latter contend that their basic model
suggests it is madness to saddle the lender with a duty to know the private information of the borrower,
while the former retort that the complexity of current credit instruments and sophistication of credit
scoring algorithms actually do diminish (and arguably reverse) the asymmetry.
185. See John A. E. Pottow, Private Liability for Reckless Consumer Lending, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV.
405, 454-55 (exploring paternalism critiques to consumer credit regulation).
186. See, e.g., id. at 432-34 (discussing reasons lenders, rather than borrowers, are more likely to be
cheapest-cost implementers of oversight policy); Engel & McCoy, supra note 70, at 1336-37 (same,
regarding mortgage lenders specifically).
187. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism is Not an Oxymoron,
70 U. CHICAGO L. REV. 1159 (2003). For a discussion of various forms of paternalism, including "soft"
and "hard," see Evans & Wright, supra note 2, at 30-3 1.
188. See European Commission, supra note 104 (suggesting this option may actually have been
eliminated by most recent version of the proposal). But cf Engel & McCoy, supra note 70, at 1348
(defending non-waiveability as permissible autonomy intrusion justified by utilitarian considerations).
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The second grievance with the new ability to pay duty is simply the
well-known lament of usury law opponents: reduction in credit availability,
either through pernicious substitution or outright rationing. 189 "The more likely
result of stricter mortgage origination rules is a return to rationing, which could
result in lower overall homeownership since some of the recent increase in
homeownership was due to the ability of subprime borrowers to access
credit."' 190 This worrying even made it into the legislative debates. One
opponent complained, for example, that "this bill.., will functionally be taking
away homeownership opportunities from [the] American people . . . . So,
ultimately what we are going to have are fewer mortgages being made."'
19 1
Another predicted that homeownership after Dodd-Frank will be "more
expensive and less available to those people who need it the most."'
92
Again, the appropriate rejoinder to this rhetoric is direct admission and
confrontation.193 One of the intended consequences of Dodd-Frank is for fewer
people to acquire mortgages-those who lack the ability to repay them in the
cold calculus of rigorous underwriting. Of course there will be errors, both
Type I and 11. 194 The question is whether one type is preferable to the other.
The mantra of increased homeownership as an intrinsic social good presumes
the former are better than the latter, but that is far from clear.' 95 On the
189. See, e.g., James J. White, The Usury Tromp I'Oeil, 51 S.C. L. REV. 445 (2000) (against usury
laws); see also Cathy L. Mansfield, The Road to Subprime "HEL" Was Paved with Good Congressional
Intentions: Usury Deregulation and the Subprime Home Equity Market, 51 S.C. L. REV. 473 (2000) (for
usury laws). An empirical cottage industry has developed seeking to prove the link between usury laws
and credit availability. For a recent example of this conceit, at least carefully executed and specifically
focused on subprimc mortgage lending, see Giang Ho & Anthony Pennington-Cross, The Impact of
Local Predatory Lending Laws on the Flow of Subprime Credit, 60 J. URB. ECON. 210 (2006).
190. Zywicki & Adamson, supra note 119, at 78.
191. 145 Cong. Rec. H5181 (daily ed. July 1, 1999) (statement of Rep. Hensarling).
192. 155 Cong. Rec. H5176 (daily ed. May 6, 2009) (statement of Rep. Sessions).
193. Consider in this regard an emerging UK proposal envisions making it even harder for "credit
impaired" borrowers to get a mortgage by requiring a twenty percent "buffer" in calculating "free
disposable income." See Consultation Paper, supra note 108, at 28.
194. Indeed, some researchers have noted that credit restriction may be ill-founded. See, e.g.,
Debbie Guienstein Bocian, Keith S. Ernst, & Wei Li, Unfair Lending: The Effect of Race and Ethnicity
on the Price of Subprime Mortgages (Ctr. for Responsible Lending), May 31, 2006. This might be
considered a "Type I !6" error.
195. See, e.g., Edward M. Gramlich, Fed. Bd. Member, Remarks at the Financial Services
Roundtable Annual Housing Policy Meeting (May 21, 2004) (noting that increased foreclosures of
subprime loans "do not seem high enough to challenge the overall positive assessment" of increased
homeownership), available at http://www.federalrescrve.gov/boarddocs/Speeches/2004/20040521/
dcfault.htm. Professor DiLorenzo explores Governor Gramlich's comments on subprime lending in
more detail in his comprehensive analysis, including his clashes with then-Chairman Alan Greenspan.
See DiLorenzo, supra note 23, at 80. The implementation of this vision through legislation such as the
1992 Federal Housing Enterprise Financial Safety and Soundness Act, 12 U.S.C. § 4501 et seq., and its
related enabling of HUD to target "goals" of minimum portfolio percentages of Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac of low and moderate income ("LMI") borrowers seems ill-considered in retrospect. See HUD's
Regulation of the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mac) and the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) 65 Fed. Reg. 65,044 (Oct. 31, 2000) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 81)
(final rulemaking), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2000-10-31/pdf/00-27367.pdf. For a
general literature review on the social benefits of homeownership, see Christopher Herbert & Eric S.
Belsky, The Homeownership Experience of Low-Income and Minority Families: A Review and Synthesis
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contrary, the spillover effects of the housing collapse, as shown in the plunging
property values of the non-foreclosed neighbors, have sharpened our
appreciation of the dangers of "false grantings" of mortgage credit. 96 Even
staunch critic Jack Guttentag admits, "Perhaps the costs associated with
borrowers who fail [in their mortgages]--costs to both themselves and their
communities-more than offset the benefits to those who succeed."1 9 7 (And
this worry was published in 2007, when the ice was just beginning to crack.)
Accordingly, rather than awkwardly tap dancing around the possible reduction
in mortgage origination due to Dodd-Frank's elimination of asset-based
mortgage lending, we should embrace it and find its likely social costs dwarfed
by its welfare benefits.
CONCLUSION
While they are not fiduciaries, mortgage lenders are now no longer
arms-length contractual counterparties: they have a duty to assess a prospective
borrower's ability to repay her loan. 198 Reliance on the asset value alone, or on
flipping the debt to another through securitization, will no longer suffice. This
dramatically transforms the debtor-creditor relationship in the residential
mortgage market. This Article has tried to chart the source of this innovation by
showing how it did not spring fully formed from Chris Dodd's head. Lenders'
duties of "responsible lending" (in the European parlance) have a rich pedigree,
both domestic and foreign. The article also offered conjecture as to how this
new duty will unfold in the United States, predicting a swath of new technical
rules of great specificity from appropriate agencies. Finally, this Article briefly
registered its alignment with the supportive normative camp: Dodd-Frank is not
just a big deal for the mortgage markets, but a good deal. Properly interpreted,
the duty to analyze ability to repay could realign the residential mortgage
market and ensure that 2008 becomes a closed chapter in commercial law
history.
of the Literature, U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. (Feb. 2006).
196. A rich literature exists on this topic. Foreclosures drag everyone down. See, e.g., Zhenguo Lin,
Eric Rosenblatt & Vincent W. Yao, Spillover Effects of Foreclosures on Neighborhood Property Values,
38 J. REAL ESTATE FINAN. ECON. 387 (2009) (collecting studies on the threat foreclosures pose to
neighborhood property value); Soaring Spillover: Accelerating Foreclosures to Cost Neighbors $502
Billion in 2009 Alone; 69.5 Million Homes Lose $7,200 on Average Over Next Four Years, 91.5 Million
Families to Lose $1.9 Trillion in Home Value; $20,300 on Average (Center for Responsible Lending),
May 2009, available at http://www.responsiblclending.org/mortgage-lending/research-analysis/soaring-
spillover-3-09.pdf.
197. Guttentag, supra note 119.
198. As a black-letter matter, the duty of course runs to the borrower. Given the negative social
consequences of the housing market collapse, however, an interesting argument can be made that the
duty is owed to the public more broadly. Such a contention, while conceptually intriguing, likely faces
an uphill doctrinal battle under current standing law. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555 (1992).
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